Rural Finance Profile of Niger by Cuevas, Carlos E.
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper No. 1273 
RURAL FINANCE PROFILE OF NIGER 
Carlos E. Cuevas 
Ohio State University 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Sociology 
May 1986 
Report prepared for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Agricultural Services Division. Some sections of 
the report were drafted by Professor Mario Masini, University of 
Bergamo. Professor Douglas Graham, Ohio State University, 
contributed helpful revisions and comments. 
RURAL FINANCE PROFILE OF NIGER 
Carlos E. Cuevas 
CONTENTS 
Summary and Conclusions 
1. Main Features of the Economy 
2. Monetary Policy and Financial Development 
2.1. Monetary Policy 
2.2. Financial Development 
3. Performance of Financial Institutions 
4. Rural Credit Outside Financial Institutions 
4.1. Non-Financial Institutions and Programs 
in Agricultural Credit 
4.2. Informal Finance in Rural Areas 
5. Infrastructure for Rural Development and 
Pricing Policies 
5.1. Agricultural Marketing 
5.2. Irrigation Development 
5.3. Pricing Policies 
6. Key Financial Institutions and an 
Overview of Rural Finance 
6.1. The "Caisse Nationale de Credit 
Agricola", CNCA 
6.2. The "Caisse Nationale d'Epargne" and 
Rural Savings 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
References 
Appendix 
i 
1 
6 
8 
13 
24 
35 
35 
42 
47 
47 
49 
50 
54 
54 
66 
73 
76 
78 
Rural Finance Profile of Niger 
Summary and Conclusions 
This report documents and discusses the functioning of rural 
financial markets in Niger. Niger is one of the poorest countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated average income per 
capita of 257 US dollars per year for 1985. After a period of 
sustained growth in the late 70's, the country's real GDP has 
declined steadily since 1980. About 90 percent of the population 
lives in the rural sector, contributing approximately 45 percent 
of total GDP. Per capita rural GDP is estimated to be the 
equivalent of 135 US dollars a year. The share of the rural 
sector in total credit is about 6 percent. The ratio od rural 
credit to rural GDP is approximately 2 percent, the lowest among 
all sectors of the economy. 
Niger is a member of the West African Monetary Union. The 
currency is the CFA franc, pegged to the French franc at the 
fixed exchange rate of 50 CFA francs per French franc. Monetary 
control and interest-rate policies are largely determined by the 
"Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest" (BCEAO). 
Prior to 1980, the country had a positive net foreign assets 
position, the government was in a net creditor position vis a vis 
the rest of the economy, domestic credit and money were growing 
steadily. After 1980, the net foreign assets position has become 
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negative, the government 
efforts are being made to 
is in a net debtor position, while 
stabilize the growth of credit and 
money in the economy. Financial deepening has occurred in Niger 
over the last 16 years, at a rather unsteady pace. The deepening 
trend became particularly unclear after 1980, due to monetary 
contraction and economic recession. 
The banking system is very underdeveloped, particularly in 
the rural areas where the branch network is very limited. The 
banking system of Niger has been increasingly servicing the 
government and the parastatals at the expense of the private 
sector. Reliance upon central bank funds and foreign borrowing 
has increased, while private sector deposits have declined. The 
economic recession of the first part of of the 80's has affected 
the profitability of banking, increased the level of delinquency 
in the loan portfolios, and increased the risk associated with 
banking activities. As a consequence, banks have reduced their 
scale of operations, shortened their term structures, and 
accentuated the urban bias of their loan portfolios. The rural 
sector has been particularly affected in this process. Not 
surprisingly, informal financial transactions play a very 
important role in the financing of rural households. Informal 
borrowing and lending explain an important part of the use of 
temporary surpluses generated in rural activities. 
The overall picture of rural financial markets in Niger is 
not very promising. There is a complete segmentation in the 
provision of financial services in rural areas. One institution, 
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the "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola" (CNCA), has the 
responsibility of delivering agricultural credit without offering 
deposit facilities to its customers. The other institution, the 
"Caisse Nationale d'Epargne" (CNE), provides deposit services to 
the rural population without engaging in lending activities of 
any sort. 
The CNCA relies on several other public or parastatal 
institutions to perform some critical credit functions. The 
identification of lending opportunities, risk assessment and 
client selection are undertaken by the parastatals and by donor-
sponsored Productivity Projects. This scheme works against the 
development of the necessary banking skills for an efficient 
performance of the CNCA. The institution is currently in a poor 
financial situation, with a large proportion of its portfolio 
tied up in loans to the parastatals. 
The CNE is the only financial institution with a national 
scope of savings activity. It operates primarily through the 
branches of the "Office des Postes et Telecommunications" (OPT). 
The CNE appears as a relatively healthy financial operation, 
partially because of the support it receives from the OPT. The 
CNE operates with very small accounts and a rural clientele 
difficult to reach and service. The subsidy implicit in the 
support received from the OPT seems moderate and justified to 
achieve this objective. 
The poor performance and precarious situation of the CNCA 
have induced increased segmentation in the agricultural credit 
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system. Existing as well as newly created agricultural 
development projects tend to establish their own credit delivery 
systems for each individual program. The CNCA has been reduced to 
serving as a mere window for the management of project accounts. 
Both institutional and non-institutional savings appear to 
be limited in the rural areas of Niger. However, there is an 
important informal financial activity at the village level. Most 
rural households engage in informal financial transactions, thus 
suggesting the existence of temporary surpluses at the household 
level. The potential role for improved financial intermediation 
depends upon the lack of coincidence of temporary surpluses and 
temporary deficits, both geographically and over time. Direct 
informal financial arrangements are efficient and least costly 
when surplus units and deficit units coincide in the same place 
(i.e., the same village) at the same point in time. However, when 
these transactions must be performed across long distances, or 
when liquidity must be "stored" through time in some form before 
an informal loan or assistance can be granted, then informal 
transactions become more costly to perform and a more formal 
vehicle for financial intermediation may be justified. Rural 
development initiatives aimed at introducing diversification in 
production, will require an improved financial intermediation 
system in rural areas to be successful. 
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1. Main Features of the Economy 
Niger is a country of 1,267,000 square kilometers, one of 
the largest in West Africa. It is landlocked with about four-
fifths of its territory in the Sahara desert. The climate is 
characterized by scarce rainfall and high temperatures. 
Precipitation ranges from about 800 mm per year in the extreme 
south (Gaya) to less than 100 mm in the north. Annual average 
temperatures range between 27 and 29 degrees centigrade across 
the different regions of the country. 
Population in 1985 is estimated at 6.1 million inhabitants, 
growing at a rate of approximately 2.8 percent per yearl. Average 
population density is the lowest in West Africa, about 4.8 
inhabitants per square kilometer. However, three-fourths of the 
population are concentrated in the more favourable areas of the 
south, where the average density is about 28 inhabitants per 
square kilometer. Two ethnic groups predominate, the Haoussa, 
accounting for about 50 percent of the total population, and the 
Zarma-Songhai-Dendi, with 24 percent. Other ethnic groups are the 
Peulh, that accounts for 10.5 percent of the population, the 
Touareg (including the Bella) with 9.5 percent, and the Kanouri-
Boudouma, with 5.5 percent. 
The estimated average GDP per capita for 1985 is the 
equivalent of 257 US dollars per year, one of the lowest in the 
1 The population census of 1977 
inhabitants. At the current growth rate, 
in 25 years. 
registered 5.1 million 
population will double 
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continent2. Table 1 shows selected indicators of the performance 
of the economr between 1978 and 1985. This performance is 
characterized by a period of rapid and sustained economic growth 
in the late 70s, followed by a crisis and a decline in the early 
80s. Real GDP reached a peak in 1980, driven by the uranium boom, 
and several years of adequate rainfall that favored agricultural 
production. After 1980 real GDP declined steadily until 1984. A 
slight recover.y was recorded in 1985. The annual growth rate of 
real GDP between 1981 and 1985 was negative 2.8 percent. As a 
consequence, per capita GDP declined during the period at an 
average annual rate of 5. 5 percent. 
The economic decline observed after 1980 is attributed to a 
drastic drop in uranium demand and prices that, together with the 
depreciation of the CFA franc, created a serious deterioration in 
the country's terms of trade (see Table 2). On the other hand, 
government capital expenditure had accelerated in the late 70's 
and did not slowed down to the extent required by the post-1980 
recession. Consequently, budget deficits have been consistently 
higher after 1980 than they were in the ""boom" years. 
Stabilization efforts undertaken after 1983 are being supported 
by the IHF, by French exceptional assistance, by AID and by debt 
relief from the Paris and London Clubs (Toh, 1986). These efforts 
have induced a gradual reduction of government deficits, from 
about 11 percent of GDP in 1981 to less than 5 percent in 1985. 
2 Estimate based on GDP at 
population figures reported above, 
to US dollars (see Table 2). 
market prices (see Table 1), 
and exchange rate conversion 
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Table 1 
N1ger: National Income Indicators, 1978 - 1985 
Year 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Bross DoMestic Product (billions of CFA francs> 
Rural Sector 
Agriculture 
Livestock 
Forestry & Ftsh. 
Mining 
Industry & Energy 
Construction & 
Public Works 
Commerce, Transport 
& Services 
Government 
SDP at Factor Cost 
Import Taxes & 
Duties 
SDP at Current 
166. 1 
87.3 
61.4 
17.4 
37.0 
16.4 
17. 1 
84.1 
22.8 
343.5 
15.6 
188.7 
96.5 
72.2 
20.0 
63.1 
19.4 
24.6 
103.2 
25.1 
424.1 
19. 1 
228. 1 
120.8 
89.0 
18.4 
67.4 
22.2 
32.1 
125.5 
33.8 
509.1 
27.1 
269.3 
154.0 
104. 1 
20.2 
52.0 
27.0 
26.6 
147.6 
39.6 
562.1 
27.8 
299.5 
156.6 
120.8 
22.1 
49.8 
32.4 
24.8 
159.1 
45.8 
611.4 
31.3 
311.5 
159.7 
128.0 
23.8 
55.5 
36.9 
23.9 
169.0 
49.8 
646.6 
28.0 
1984 
268.2 
153. 1 
92.7 
22.4 
53.6 
35.7 
19.2 
161.9 
52.8 
591.4 
24.0 
1985 
332.1 
207.5 
100.0 
24.6 
59.3 
38.5 
23.7 
171.6 
54.9 
680.1 
25.0 
Market Prices 359.1 443.2 536.2 589.9 642.7 674.6 615.4 705.1 
SDP at Constant 
1976 Prices 268.2 307.6 327.0 323.9 321.4 313.0 262.7 280.1 
Implictt GOP 
Deflator(1976=100) 133.9 144.1 164.0 182.1 199.9 215.5 234.3 251.3 
Annual Srowth Rates (percent> 
Real GDP 7.2 14.7 6.3 -0.9 -0.8 -2.6 -16.1 6.6 
Real GOP/capita 4.5 11. 1 3.6 -3.7 -3.5 -5.3 -18.9 3.8 
GDP Deflator 16.0 7.6 13.8 11. (I 9.8 7.8 8.7 7.5 
Sources: Toh (1986), and IMF, International Financial Statistics (1985). 
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Table 2 
Niger: Selected Economic Indicators, 1978 - 1985 
Year 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Trade and Payments 
Exports (mil.US$) 290.7 487.1 578.2 486.7 370.5 376.8 326.1 294.7 
Imports (mil.US$) 410.0 628.5 794.1 662.8 520.4 424.3 340.5 411.9 
Current account 
deficit (2 of SDP) 7.5 6.8 8.5 8.1 7.7 2.7 1.0 7.5 
Terms of Trade 
(1980=100) 88.2 97.5 100.0 63.5 63.0 62.3 57.7 60.6 
Exchange rate 
<CFA/US$) 225.7 212.7 211.3 271.7 328.6 381.1 437.0 449.3 
Public Finance 
Domestic 
revenue <Y. of SDPI 
Expenditure 
(Y. of GDP> 
Budget 
deficit (/. of GDP> 
Bross Fixed 
Inveshent 
<I of GDP> 
12.8 
16.5 
3.7 
25.3 
13.5 13.7 
16.7 19.7 
3.2 6.0 
25.5 25.5 
12.7 11.5 10.2 11.4 9.6 
23.6 18.5 17.4 16.4 14.4 
10.9 7.0 7.2 5.0 4.8 
22.0 18.7 13.5 13.3 14.9 
Sources: Toh (19861, and IMF, International Financial Statistics (various 
issues). 
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The rural sector contributed on average with 45 percent of 
total gross domestic product in the period 1978-1985, with little 
variation during this period (see table A.l in the Appendix). 
Since about 90 percent of the population lives in rural areas, it 
follows that average per capita productivity in the rural sector 
is less than one-tenth the per-capita productivity in the non-
rural economy. For 1985, per capita rural GDP is estimated to be 
only 135 US dollars per year, as compared to approximately 1,361 
US dollars per year in the non-rural sector. 
In the rural sector, agriculture (crop production) accounts 
for over one-half of total rural output, whereas livestock 
contributed over one-third of rural GDP in the period 1978-1985. 
Livestock production experienced a sharp decline in 1984 (even in 
nominal terms) with respect to previous years, as a result of the 
serious drought of that year and the closure of the Nigerian 
border3. 
Millet, sorghum and rice are the main food crops. Millet 
production accounts for 77 percent of total physical production 
of these cereals. Sorghum represents about 20 percent, and rice 
accounts for about 3 percent of total cereal production. Rice 
production has increased steadily since 1979 {see table A.2 in 
the Appendix). Rice and cotton were the only crops not seriously 
3 Nigeria has been a very important market for livestock 
from Niger. Even though some clandestine trade is believed to 
continue, these transactions are not registered in the national 
accounts. 
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affected by the drought of 1984, due to the support of irrigation 
facilities. 
Cowpeas (niebe) are considered both a food crop and a cash 
crop. The principal cash crops were traditionally groundnuts and 
cotton, but cowpeas have surpassed them in the volume of output 
and the value of production. Production and exports of 
vegetables, such as green beans and onions, have increased 
significantly since 1978, and are currently being favored by 
policies promoting "counter-seasonal" cultivation in irrigated 
areas. 
2. Monetary Policy and Financial Development 
Niger is a member of the West African Monetary Union ("Union 
Monetaire Ouest-Africaine", UMOA). All member countries of the 
UMOA - Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
and Togo - share a common currency, the CFA franc, and the same 
central bank, the "Banque Centrale des Etats de 1 'Afrique de 
l'Ouest", BCEAO. France is represented on the Board of the BCEAO 
and supports the DMOA to maintain the free convertibility of the 
CFA franc into the French franc. This support is provided through 
overdraft facilities in the operations account that the BCEAO 
holds with the French Treasury. The BCEAO in turn is required to 
de~?Osit 65 percent of its foreign-currency reserves in French 
francs in the operations account. The CFA franc is currently 
pegged to the French franc at a fixed exchange rate of 50 CFA 
francs to one French franc. Therefore, exchange policies in Niger 
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and all other member countries of UMOA are automatically aligned 
with those adopted by France. 
As a member of UHOA, Niger has a limited degree of autonomy 
in controlling its money supply and credit. The main tool of the 
UHOA for liquidity control in member countries is rediscounting 
by the BCEAO. The BCEAO sets annual targets for total central 
bank financing in each member state, taking into account 
production, prices, liquidity, the balance of payments target, 
the level of foreign reserves of each country, and the total 
foreign reserves of the area as a whole. The annual limits 
exclude seasonal credit for financing crops and agricultural 
exports. Within the fixed limits on BCEAO rediscounting 
established for each country, the country's National Credit 
Committee decides freely on specific credit allocation. However, 
the proportion of a bank's total credit rediscounted with the 
BCEAO should not exceed 45 percent, and credit to governments is 
limited to a maximum of 20 percent of the previous year's 
officially recorded fiscal revenue. Rediscount rates are 
determined by the Board of the BCEAO. 
The sectoral distribution of credit is influenced by 
imposing the prior approval of loans in excess of 30 million CFA 
francs, and by applying preferential rediscount rates to specific 
loans. These special lines of credit respond to the requirements 
of seasonal farming, small and medium-size enterprises, and small 
scale construction. Sectoral priorities are established by each 
government, and implemented by the BCEAO. In the case of Niger, 
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the order of priority is: agriculture, Nigerian enterprises, 
industry and mining, construction, transport and commerce. 
Despite these priorities, the rural sector (agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries) is the economic activity with the lowest 
share in total credit to the private sector. As shown in Table 3, 
the average share of the rural sector in total private sector 
credit in the period 1980-1983 was only about 6 percent, whereas 
the sector's average contribution to non-government GDP in the 
same period was 51 percent. The ratio of institutional credit to 
GDP for the rural sector was only 2 percent in the period 1980-
1983. Construction and Public Works, and Industry and Energy are 
the sectors with the highest credit-to-GDP ratios in this period. 
The financing of rural production will be further discussed later 
in this report. 
2.1. Monetary Policy 
The behavior of the major monetary aggregates between 1978 
and 1985 is summarized in Table 4. The money supply shows a 
period of steady growth between 1978 and 1981, at an average rate 
of about 20 percent per year in nominal terms, more or less in 
line with the growth rate of nominal GDP. There was a severe 
contraction in the money supply in 1982, when it declined by 
almost 12 percent, followed by a year of almost no change. This 
behavior reflects the overall economic decline observed after 
1980. The years 1984 and 1985 can be considered as an adjustment 
period. In 1984 the money supply overshot its previous growth 
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Table 3 
Niger: Sectoral Shares in GDP and in Total Private Sector Credit. 
Sector 
Rural• 
Mining 
Industry & Energy 
Construction & 
Public Works 
Commerce, Transport 
& Services 
All Non-government 
Averages for the Period 1980 - 1983. 
Share in 
Non-government 
GDP at factor cost 
I. 
51.17 
10.54 
5.43 
5.07 
27.80 
Share in Total 
Private Sector 
Credit 
6.22 
9. 11 
16.59 
15.58 
52.50 
Credit to 
GDP 
ratio 
I. 
2.05 
14.80 
51.37 
52.92 
31.86 
16.89 
Sources: Table 1, and Ministere du Plan, Bulletin de Statistique (1984). 
• Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 
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Table 4 
Niger: Monetary Survey, 1978 - 1995 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Year 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985• 
---------------------------~----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. ltaaetary Aggregates in billions of CFA francs, H of Decelber of each year 
!Ioney Supply 54.20 64.51 77.93 94.07 82.98 82.69 101.02 110.21 
Currency outside banks 
plus deaand deposits 46.39 57.27 64.59 74.75 70.93 66.55 78.41 
Quasi-toney 7.80 7.24 13.34 19.32 12.05 16.14 22.62 
Net Foreign Assets 20.00 18.69 8.72 18.64 -24.00 -18.59 -0.95 -3.43 
Long-Tert Foreign Borrowing 1.38 3.50 9.45 16.55 20.03 28.12 28.01 35.45 
Daaestic Credit 42.36 57.46 82.31 98.97 126.70 130.81 120.20 134.50 
Net claias an governaent -11.88 -18.36 -7.49 -2.98 16.34 17.86 22.01 26.90 
Claias an private sectorb 54.24 75.82 89.80 101.95 110.36 112.95 98.19 107.60 
Other Itns CneU 6.78 8.14 3.65 6,99 -0.31 1.41 -9.79 -6.38 
B. Annual Percentage Change 
!laney Supply 19.02 20.80 20.71 -11.79 -0.35 22.18 9.09 
Currency outside banks 
plus deland deposits 23.45 12.78 15.73 -5.11 -6.18 17.82 
Quasi-•oney -7.18 84.25 44.87 -37.63 33.94 40.15 
Net Foreign Assets -6.55 -53.34 113.76 -228.76 22.54 94.89 -155.79 
Long-Ter• Foreign Borrowing 153.62 170.00 75.13 21.03 40.39 -0.39 25.85 
Doustic Credit 35.65 43.25 20.24 28.02 3.24 -8.11 11.90 
Net clai1s an governaent -54.55 40.80 60.21 648.32 9.30 23.24 22.22 
Clails on private sector 39.79 18.57 13.40 8.25 2.35 -13.07 9.58 
Other Iteas !net) 20.06 -55.16 91.51 -104.43 554.84 -794.33 34.83 
--------------------------------------------------------------~---------------------------------------~-----
Sourca• IMF, International Financial Statistics 11985 yearbook, and April 1986), 
• Projections IToh, 1986, and this study>. 
~ Includes other financial institutions. 
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record, growing at over 22 percent in nollli.nal terms, even though 
the economy was in even deeper recession than previous years. Two 
exogenous factors referred to in the previous section may help 
explain this loss of control of the money supply, the drought of 
1984, and the depreciation of the CFA franc. Both phenomena may 
have forced a larger monetary expansion aimed at financing 
emergency relief and more expensive iaports. Money grew less than 
10 percent in 1985, as a consequence of the efforts to adjust to 
the target ceilings established under the IMF stand-by programs. 
The growth pattern of domestic credit shows three distinct 
periods. First, two years of rapid growth (1979 and 1980) at an 
annual average of almost 40 percent, that can be associated with 
the growth in the money supply observed in this same period. This 
was followed by two years of moderate growth of domestic credit, 
at an average rate of 24 percent per year, and subsequently by a 
drastic contraction of credit growth in the period 1983-1985. The 
average annual percentage change of domestic credit during these 
three years was only 2.3 percent, what amounts to a reduction of 
approximately 5 percent per year in real terms. 
It is important to highlight the changes in the distribution 
of domestic credit that ocurred during the period covered by 
Table 4. The major feature here was the change in the net 
position of the government, from creditor to debtor, in 1982. 
Even though this change of sign in the net claims on goverDJDent 
occurs in 1982 (panel A in Table 4) , the trend in this direction 
indeed started in 1980, when the net creditor position of the 
12 
government starts declining very rapidly, i.e., the net claims on 
government start increasing dramatically (panel B in Table 4). 
The average annual increase of net claims on government between 
1980 and 1982 was about 250 percent. This trend changed rather 
drastically in the sub-period 1983-1985, during which the annual 
increase in net credit to government averaged 18 percent. This 
slow-down is a consequence of the adoption of IMF-induced 
austerity measures since 1983. A result of the observed growth in 
credit to the government is that the share of the private sector 
in total domestic credit declined from over 100 percent until 
1981 to about 80 percent in 1985. 
This reversal in the net credit position of the government 
has been attributed to two major factors. First, it was due to 
balance of payments disequilibria, caused by large trade deficits 
in 1980 and 1981, increasing debt servicing, and a decline in 
non-monetary capital inflows in 1982. Second, the reversal grew 
out of increasing government deficits resulting from a stagnation 
of government revenue, and growing extrabudgetary capital 
spending under the five-year development plan undertaken in 1979 
(Toh, 1986). These phenomena had consequences in the composition 
of the sources of funds for the banking system, and particularly 
in the magnitudes of foreign borrowing. Prior to 1981, treasury 
and public-sector deposits with public banks~ provided an 
important part of the banking system's liquidity base. This had 
4 The "Banque de Developpement de la Republique du Niger" 
(BDRN), and the "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola" (CNCA). 
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allowed the banks to limit their recourse to Central Bank 
rediscounting and foreign borrowing as sources of funds. However, 
the withdrawal of deposits by public enterprises in 1981-1982 
forced the banks to rely upon Central Bank rediscount and foreign 
borrowing to finance the increasing demand for credit from the 
government. This increased credit demand can be traced back to 
financial difficulties of public enterprises, primarily official 
marketing agencies, and the pre-financing of government 
extrabudgetary investment projects (Toh, 1986). Both short-term 
and long-term foreign borrowing increased substantially after 
1980, leading to a negative net foreign assets position (see 
Table 4, panel A), and a sustained growth in long-term foreign 
liabilities. 
In summary, the overall 
years of the 80's differs 
observed in the late 70's. 
monetary picture in the first five 
substantially from the situation 
Prior to 1980, the country had a 
positive net foreign assets position, the government was in a net 
creditor position vis a vis the rest of the economy, domestic 
credit and money were growing steadily. After 1980, the net 
foreign assets position has become negative, the government is in 
a net debtor position, while efforts are been made to stabilize 
the growth of credit and money in the economy. 
2. 2. Financial Development 
The usual financial deepening indicators are s1ummarized in 
Table 5 for the period 1970 to 1985. In this 16-year period the 
Table 5 
Niger: Financial Deepening Indicators, 1970 - 1985 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------... -----------... ---·--------... -----Year 
Indicator 1970 1971 1972 11173 1974 1975 1971> tm 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
-----------------------------------------------------------------... ------------------... --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------... ---
l. T ohl !Ioney as X of SDP 8.65 10.64 9.48 12.09 12.78 14.14 12.57 13.03 14.97 14.57 14.75 15.74 12.70 1 I .Bb 16.42 15.63 
2. Currency in Circulation 4.38 5.03 4.54 5.20 5.90 5.98 5.76 5.14 5.45 6.16 5.88 5.83 5.40 4.52 4.99 
is 1 of GOP 
3. Deposit !Ioney as l of GDP 4.26 5.21 4.94 6.90 6.87 8.17 6.80 7.89 9.52 8.41 8.87 9.91 7.30 7.34 11.41 
4, Dotestic Credit asl11f GDP 7.511 6.25 5.30 7.06. 8.6.9 10.81 6.97 5.6.3 11. 6'1 12.98 15.56 16.55 19.39 18.04 19.46 19.(18 
5. Chang!! in llet Foreign 
Li abi li tas as 1 of 6DP -- -3.10 -15.0 -0.80 0.10 -0,30 -3.30 -I. 70 1.10 0.90 3.20 -0.30 7.10 0.60 -3.40 3.51 
6, Change in Total 
!Ioney !Noai nall 1 
--
26.45 6.27 20.22 31.03 9.80 31.10 28.70 44.00 19.02 20.81 20.70 -It. 79 -0.35 22.18 9.09 
1. Change in Total 
tloney !Reali % " -- 22.45 -3.112 8.47 27.67 0.71 7.49 5.43 33.97 11.68 10.56 -2.20 -23.43 -2.84 13.81 9.32 
8. Change in Total 
!Ioney CReal I 1 " -- -- -- -- -- -- 14.80 13.30 28.00 11.42 7.01 9.70 -21.59 -8.16 13.49 I. 59 
9. Inflation Rate 1 " -- 4.0 9.89 11.75 3.36 9.09 23.61 23.27 10.03 7.34 1o.25 22.90 1t.b4 -2.48 8.37 -0.23 
10. lnfl at ion Rate I " -- -- -- -- -- -- 16..30 15.40 16.00 7.60 13.80 11.00 9.80 7.80 8.70 7.50 
______________________________________________________________________________________ ,.. _______________________________________ ,.. ________________________________________________________ 
Sources: BCEAD, Bulletin Statistique !various issues). 
IIIF 1 lnternahnill Financial Statishn (various 1ssuesl. 
Table 41 th1s report. 
" Coaputed using the Con~;uaer Price Index for African fa111ies, annual averages. 
- Co1puted using the ilplic1t SDP deflator. 
c Calculated using the average index of first three quarters 1985. 
1-' 
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ratio of total money (i.e., currency plus deposit money) over GDP 
almost doubled, following a rather unstable path that can be 
attributed to the erratic fluctuations of the nominal money 
supply. Despite this deepening process observed over the last 16 
years, Niger's financial sector is still very underdeveloped, as 
compared to other low-income countries. 
The period covered in Table 5 can be divided into three sub-
periods: 1970-1975, 1976-1981, and 1982-1985. During the first 
sub-period the Deposit-to-GDP ratio (row 3 in Table 5) grew at a 
faster rate than the Domestic credit-to-GDP ratio (row 4 in Table 
5), i.e., deposit money was growing faster than domestic credit. 
The opposite holds for the second sub-period. This implies a 
relatively better performance in the first sub-period in that 
there was a larger contribution of financial processes in the 
working of the economy. During this sub-period, banks were 
servicing credit demand by drawing primarily upon deposit 
mobilization from the public, rather than by refinancing from the 
Central Bank. 
During the 
seems to have 
Rediscounting 
second sub-period, 1976-1981, credit deepening 
been somewhat forced by the Central Bank. 
from the Central Bank substituted for the 
mobilization of resources from the general public as a source of 
funding for credit. These years correspond to the period of rapid 
economic growth driven by uranium production and exports. 
Domestic credit as a proportion of GDP grew almost three-fold, 
whereas the deposit-to-GDP ratio stagnated after 1978. The 
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overall increase in net foreign liabilities observed during this 
sub-period helped inflate nominal financial variables as a 
proportion of naainal GDP, as Niger drew upon foreign borrowing 
to finance more of its domestic activity. 
The last sub-period, 1982-1986 is characterized by drastic 
contractionar,y monetary measures, associated with overall 
economic recession. As a consequence, financial deepening ratios 
(total-money/GDP, and deposit-money/GDP) fell in 1982 and 1983 
with respect to previous years, and then increased in 1984. This 
increase was due to the deep recession observed that year, and to 
the monetary expansion induced by emergency relief and the 
depreciation of the currency. Domestic credit as a proportion of 
GDP remained more or less constant in this last sub-period. 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the behavior of 
financial variables in real terms. As is clear in rows 7 and 8 in 
Table 5, rows 7 and 8, this behavior is very sensitive to the 
choice of a deflator, thus making conclusions conditional upon 
the index chosen to correct for inflation. 
The behavior of interest rates, as indicated earlier, is 
fully determined by the policies established by the UMOA for the 
CFA-franc currency area. Three sets of interest rates are 
important to consider here. First, there are the rediscount rates 
established by the BCEAO, along with aargin regulations, that 
determine the range of lending rates authorized to banks. Second, 
there is the structure of interest rates to be paid on deposits, 
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and third, the set of interest rates prevailing in the tJHOA' s 
money market. 
Figure 1 shows the behavior of rediscount rates over the 
last ten years. Between 1975 and 1981 the normal rediscount rate 
( "taux d' escompte normal"', TEN) , and the preferential rediscount 
rate { ••taux d' escompte prefltrentiel•• , TEP) remained constant at 8 
percent and 5 percent respectively. Both rates increased by two 
and a half points in April 1980, and were raised again by two 
points in April 1982. The most recent rate adjustment by the 
BCEAO, in December 1984, lowered the normal rediscount rate to 
10.5 percent, and the preferential rate to 8 percent. This 
preferential rate applies to crop financing, to small and medium-
size domestic firms with overall outstanding debt of less than 30 
million CFA francs, and to first hoae construction for residents 
of UMOA member countries. 
The BCEAO regulates the rates applicable to different types 
of loans by setting liaits to the margins that can be added to 
the relevant rediscount rate. The current structure of nomdnal 
lending rates derived fraa these BCEAO regulations is reported in 
Table 6, along with the structure of rates prevailing in 1982-
1984. At present, lending rates range between a llli.ni.awa of 9 
percent and a maximum of 15.5 percent. Other commissions and 
value-date mechanisms that can increase the effective interest 
rate charged on loans are also regulated by the BCKAO. The 
current lending rates reported in Table 6 iaply a range of real 
interest rates on loans from 1.5 percent to 8 percent, as 
Rediscount 
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% 
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Table 6 
BCEAO Regulations and Lending Rates, 1982 - 1965 
Regulation 
Line of Credit Rediscount 
rate X 
Short and Medium-Term loans 
Seasonal crop financing 
and agr. exports 
Small and medium-sized 
TEP• 
domestic firms with TEP 
overall outstanding debt 
less than CFA F 30 million 
First home construction for 
UMDA res1dents, loans less TEP 
than CFA F 1.5 million 
Other short and medlum-term TENb 
Long-Term Loans 
Small and medium-sized 
domestic firms with overall 
outstanding debt less than TEP 
CFA F 30 million, and resid-
ual maturity less than 10 years 
First home construction for 
UHOA residents, less than TEP 
CFA F 1.5 million and resid-
ual maturity less than 10 years 
Other 1 ong-term TEN 
Overall Range 
Source: BCEAO 
Margin 
X 
1 - 2 
1 - 3 
1 - 3 
0 - 5 
1 - 3 
1 - 3 
(! - 5 
Range of loan Rates t 
1982-1984 1985-present 
11 - 12 9 - 10 
11 - 13 9 - 11 
11 - 13 9 - 11 
12.5 - 17.5 10.5 - 15.5 
11 - 13 9 - 11 
11 - 13 9 - 11 
12.5 - 17.5 10.5 - 15.5 
11 - 17.5 9 - 15.5 
• TEP: Preferential rediscount rate ("taux d'esco11pte preferentiel"), see text. 
b TEN: Normal rediscount rate ("taux d'escompte normal">, see text. 
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compared to a range of 2.2 to 8.7 percent in the period 1982-
19845. 
The interest rates authorized for deposits also experienced 
a drop in December 1984, in line with the adjustment of 
rediscount rates. Table 7 summarizes the structure of nominal 
interest rates on private deposits for the years 1982 through 
19856. The rate reduction in this case was one percentage point 
across the board, except for demand deposits where the obligation 
to pay interest was lifted for two years, starting in January 
1985. In real terms, the rates reported in Table 7 imply a range 
between -1.25 percent and 2 percent in 1985, not considering 
demand deposits. In the period 1982-1984, the range of real 
interest rates on deposits was -1.5 to 1.7 percent. In summary, 
BCEAO regulations and Niger's inflation rates have resulted in a 
structure of real lending rates and real deposit rates more or 
less stable over the last 4 years. The interest costs of borrowed 
funds have been positive in real terms. The real returns on bank 
deposits implied by the authorized rates have been positive for 
savings deposits and certain categories of time deposits. This 
statement, however, may not apply to effective returns received 
by depositors, since this depends on the effective rate paid by 
banks, and on the transaction costs of holding deposit accounts. 
5 Estimates obtained using the average inflation rate of the 
implicit GDP deflator. 
6 BCEAO regulations establish that interest rates on public 
sector deposits are determined by agreement between the 
contracting parties. In Niger, these rates tend to follow the 
general regulations on private sector deposits. 
21 
Table 7 
Interest-Rate Regulations on Private Deposits 
Type of Deposit 
Demand Deposits• 
T11ne Deposits 
Less than 6 months 
6 months to less 
than 1 year 
1 year or more 
Sav1ngs Deposits 
Source: BCEAO 
Up to 200 1 000 
1982 
-1984 
0 
7.25 
fixed 
8.25 
fixed 
9.25 
m1n. 
9.50 
1985 
0 
6.25 
fixed 
7.25 
fixed 
8.25 
min. 
8.50 
Size of Account CFA francs 
200,001 to 
500,000 
1982 1985 
-1984 
4.5 
fixed 
7.75 6.75 
fixed fixed 
8.75 7.75 
fixed fixed 
10.00 9.00 
min. min. 
<Hal<imum size of 
member country. 
individuals). 
500,001 to 
2,000,000 
1982 1985 
-1984 
5.0 
fixed 
8.25 
fixed 
9.50 
fixed 
10.50 
11i n. 
7.25 
fixed 
8.50 
fixed 
9.50 
min. 
more than 
2,000,000 
1982 1985 
-1984 
5.0 
min. 
8.25 
min. 
9.50 
min. 
10.50 
min. 
7.25 
min. 
8.50 
min. 
9.50 
min. 
account established by each 
In Niger: 5 million CFA for 
• Obligation to pay interest on demand deposits was suspended for two years, 
starting January 1985. 
It can be expected 
receiving a positive 
conditions. 
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that only large, long-term time deposits are 
real rate of return under the current 
Finally, the other set of interest rates of importance is 
the one prevailing in the UMOA's money market. The creation of 
the UMOA's money market in 1975 responded to the objective of 
providing the BCEAO with another instrument of monetary control. 
Also, it is expected that the access to this money market will 
induce the banks in the union to keep their excess reserves 
within the currency area, thus reducing capital flight from the 
UMOA countries. Even though interest rates in this market should 
reflect demand and supply, .. this generally is not the case. 
Interest rates are set by the BCEAO, absorbing any excess supply 
or demand of funds at the administrative set rates" {Toh, 1984, 
pp.33). The average annual interest rates in the money market are 
reported in Table 8 for the period 1975-1985. The behavior of 
these rates over time has followed closely the shifts in the 
rediscount rates set by the BCEAO discussed above. 
It is not clear if the existence of the money market bas 
been effective in preventing capital flight from the UMOA region. 
However, it is clear from Table 8 that the structure of money 
market rates do offer banks an interesting alternative to lending 
at preferential rates. For example, the range of interest rates 
authorized to be charged on preferential lines of credit is 
currently 9 to 11 percent {see Table 6). To the extent that there 
is at least some uncertainty of repayment involved in these 
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Table 8 
Average Annual Interest Rates in the Honey Market, 1975 - 1985 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Overnight One-month Three-month 
Year Deposits Advances Deposits Advances Deposits Advances 
i. i. i. 
--------------------- --------------------- -------------------- ----------
1975 7.000 7.125 
1976 6.875 7.125 
1977 7.000 7.250 
1978 7.250 7.500 7.063 7.313 7. 125 7.375 
1979 6.938 7.188 7.063 7.313 7.313 7.563 
1980 10.250 10.531 10.375 10.625 10.625 10.875 
1981 14.500 14.813 14.625 14.875 14.875 15.125 
1982 14.000 14.333 14. 125 14.375 14.375 14.625 
1983 11. 500 11.813 11. 625 12.875 11. 875 12.125 
1984 11. 125 11. 406 11.250 11. 500 11.800 11.750 
1985 10.625 10.875 10.750 11.000 11.000 11.250 
Source: Toh <1986). 
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loans, a 3-month deposit in the money market with a certain 
return of 11 percent appears as a more attractive use of the 
banks' liquidity. This mechanism may have allowed banks to reduce 
the size of their loan portfolio in the recession years, without 
seriously compromising their viability. 
In summary, this section has shown that financial deepening 
has occurred in Niger over the last 16 years, at a rather 
unsteady pace. The deepening trend has become particularly 
unclear after 1980, due to monetary contraction and economic 
recession. The following section will discuss with more detail 
the performance of financial institutions during this period. 
3. Performance of Financial Institutions 
The banking system of Niger is comprised of nine banks, in 
addition to the BCEAO. Three of these institutions are considered 
public development banks, the "Credit du Niger" (CN), the "Banque 
de Developpement de la Republique du Niger" (BDRN), and the 
"Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola" (CNCA). The other six banks 
are private commercial institutions, the "Banque Internationale 
pour le Commerce et l'Industrie du Niger" (BICIN), the "Banque 
Lybienne Nigerienne pour le Commerce Exterieur et le 
Developpemen.t" (BALINEX), the Citibank, the "Banque 
Internationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale" (BIAO), the "Massraf 
Faycal Al Islami-Niger" (MFIN), and the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International {BCCI). Table 9 shows some of the main 
characteristics of the Nigerian banking system. 
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Table 9 
N1ger: Selected Features of the Bank1ng System, 1985 
Establ1shed 
Bank <year) 
Publ1c Development 
Banks 
CN 1958 
BORN 1961 
CNCA 1967 
Pn vate Coauaerc1al 
Banks 
BICIN 1978 
BALINEX 1978 
C1tlbank 1979 
BIAO 1979 
MFIN 1983 
BCCI 1984 
Government 
Share 1n 
Ownersh1p 
i. 
45.4 
37.0 
100.0 
0 
50.0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Sources: BCEAO and banks' balance-sheets. 
Number of 
Permanent 
Branches 
1 
11 
5 
1 
1 
1 
5 
1 
1 
Market Shares .. 
Pr1vate Total Total 
Depos1ts Loans 
7. 7. 
50.0 63.3 
12.5 
16.4 8.3 
3. 1 4. 1 
0.3b 0.2b 
30.0 15.8 
Assets 
% 
44.0 
9.1 
6.9 
3.0 
0.9 
17.0 
• Market shares (end of 1985) are approx1mate due to d1fferences 1n 
class1f1cat1ons of depos1ts and loans across banks. 
b 1982 est1mates. 
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Among the banks controlled by the government, the CN 
provides financing for small equipment and real estate, mainly 
to public employees. The BDBN is in fact a multi-service bank 
dealing in all areas of credit activity, taking on equity 
participations, and providing deposit and payment services, among 
other typical banking services. The CNCA specializes in financing 
agriculture and other rural economic activities. Except for 
BALINEX, there is no government participation in the ownership of 
commercial banks. All other commercial banks are controlled by 
foreign capital. 
Other government-controlled, non-bank financial institutions 
are the following: 
(i) the "Caisse Nationale D'Epargne" (CNE) mobilizes deposits 
(about 1 billion CFA francs as of November 1985) through the Post 
Office branch network. This institution will be dealt with in 
more detail later; 
(ii) the "Caisse de Pr8t.s aux Collectivites Territ.oriales (CPCT), 
whose function is to provide loans to local governments (total 
assets 1.5 billion CFA francs as of September 1982); 
(iii) the "Fond d'Intervention en Faveur des Petites et Moyennes 
Entreprises Nigeriennes" (FIPMEN), that provides guarantees, 
interest subsidies, risk capital and consulting services to small 
and medium-sized business firms with at least 80 percent Nigerian 
ownership. FIPHEN was established in 1983, and operates through 
the "Office de Promotion de l'Entreprise Nigerienne" (OPEN); 
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(iv) the "Societe Nigerienne de Credit Automobile" (SONICA), that 
provided car financing until its dissolution in 1985. 
As shown in Table 9, the branch network of the Nigerian 
banking system is extremely limited. There are only 27 bank 
branches in the country, of which about one third are located in 
the capital city. This represents approximately one bank branch 
for every 226 thousand inhabitants, undoubtedly one of the lowest 
ratios in the world. One of the poorest countries in Asia, 
Bangladesh has a ratio of one branch for about 25 thousand 
people, while one of the poorest countries in Latin America, 
Honduras, has one bank branch for every 15 thousand inhabitants. 
This degree of underdevelopment of the banking system is not 
unusual in Sub-Saharan Africa however, since the size of the 
banking system in relation to the size of the population appears 
to be even smaller in Mali?. 
Only three banks have a relatively more developed branch 
network, the BDRN, the BIAO, and the CNCA. Among all banks, the 
BDRN has the dominant market share both in loans and deposits. 
The second largest bank is the BIAO, followed by the BICIN. The 
CNCA has no deposit collection activity, but ranks third in the 
market share o£ total loans. However, there is s01ae degree o£ 
segmentation in the loan market. The BDRN has about 30 percent of 
its loan portfolio in the public sector, whereas commercial banks 
serve mainly the financial needs o£ private commercial firms. The 
7 The ratio implicit in the figures reported by Masini 
(1985) is one branch per 288.5 thousand inhabitants. 
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CNCA on the other hand, is fully specialized in financing 
economic activities in rural areas, and a number of parastatals 
associated with rural activities. 
The overall rate of growth of the Nigerian banking system 
decreased considerably during the last few years for which data 
are available. Total assets and liabilities increased 26 percent 
in 1982, 10.6 percent in 1981, and only 5.2 percent in 1983. The 
larger commercial banks and the CNCA reported an overall decrease 
in absolute size for 1984. 
The composition of assets and liabilities in the Nigerian 
banking system is reported in Table 10 for the years 1980 through 
1983. The structure of the sources of funds of the banking system 
(panel B in Table 10) is characterized by some negative trends. 
There was a marked decrease of private sector deposits during the 
period covered by Table 10. As discussed in a previous section, 
this fall in private sector deposits, accompanied by the 
government liquidity crisis and the withdrawal of public-sector 
deposits, induced a very sharp increase in Central Bank credit, 
and in foreign borrowing. This heavier reliance upon Central Bank 
credit weakens incentives towards the development of the banking 
system. Also, the share of permanent funds in total liabilities 
showed a slightly decreasing trend in a system that was 
undergoing a serious recession. Unless fresh risk capital is 
invested in banks, this negative trend cannot be reversed, given 
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Table 10 
Niger: Composition of Assets and Liab1l1ties 
of the Banking System, 1990 - 1983 
Year 
1990 1981 1981 1993 
/. /. /. /. 
A. Assets 
Reserves 2.83 3.73 2.46 3.46 
Foreign Loans 3.98 2.61 1. 61 3.46 
Credit to Government 7.76 11.26 12.69 12.17 
Credit to Non-government 65.47 59.18 57.63 57.38 
Other Assets 20.88 23.16 25.55 23.52 
Total Assets 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
B. Liab1llties 
Private Sector Deposits 34.00 34.42 24.96 25.41 
Government Deposits 13.27 10.13 B. 19 7.79 
Central Bank Credit 10.07 13.27 16.44 16.96 
Foreign Liabil1ties 21.40 16.88 28.01 27.75 
Permanent Funds 9.62 8.83 8.89 9.11 
Other Liabilit1es 11.63 16.41 13.50 12.93 
Total Liabilities 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Ministere du Plan, Bulletin de Statistique (1984), 
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the fact that all the largest banks reported net losses in 19848. 
The prospects for an expansion of banking activity are therefore 
unpromising. 
On the asset side, illustrated in panel A of Table 10, the 
most striking feature is the fall in the share of credit to the 
non-government economy, accompanied by an increase in the share 
of credit to the government in total assets. This can be 
partially explained by a contraction in non-government economic 
activity. At the same time, the decline in the share of credit to 
the non-government sector may reflect the "crowding out" of other 
financial assets in the banks' portfolios by rigid government 
financing demands, in a period of monetary restraint. 
Consideration should also be given to the fact that over 30 
percent of the bank credit to non-government sectors goes to 
public or semi-public entreprises operating in these areas. Thus 
a large proportion of the Nigerian banking system is involved in 
lending activity to borrowers that usually do not meet normal 
creditworthiness criteria. The effect of this situation on the 
development of the banking system is well known. If the lending 
risk is still borne by the banks, they are likely to suffer 
serious financial difficulties and/or a sharp scaling down of 
their activity. If the risk is passed on to other lenders of last 
resort, more explicitly to the government budget, then banks will 
turn into mere administrative entities of the government. In this 
8 An exception to this was the CNCA, but loan-loss data and 
revenue accounting in this institution are questionable. 
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case, they will gradually lose the prerogatives of an independent 
firm, and will have little need for developing the banking skills 
required for institutional viability. 
The Nigerian banking system appears to be beaded in this 
unpromising direction of financial contraction or shallowing. The 
BDRN, which was called upon since its creation to bear fully the 
weight of supporting government sponsored accelerated industrial 
development objectives, suffers today the consequences of these 
policies. Its bad-debt ratio is about 50 percent, it has 
difficulties attracting resources, operates with poor 
administrative procedures, an inflated personnel roster and 
superfluous fixed investment. A restructuring process is underway 
in the BDRN, but unless an appropriate system of incentives and 
sanctions is established, and current constraints on proper 
banking practices are reaoved, there is little likelihood of 
improvement. 
The case of the CNCA has some special features that are 
dealt with in a later section of this report. However, in brief, 
the CNCA shares a common feature of public financial 
institutions, namely, the constant abuse of these institutions as 
conduits for debt financing of government current expenditures 
for public enterprises. 
The BCEAO reported an increase of doubtful loans of 76.5 
percent in 1983, and a further increase of 76.7 percent in 1984 
for the banking system as a whole. This is probably the result of 
several negative factors affecting the Nigerian economy after the 
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end of the uranium boom. However, it also seems likely that the 
UHOA and the domestic authorities in Niger have no pronounced 
concern for financial institution building. Thus, policies 
affecting financial institutions in Niger tend to neglect the 
need for financial viability. Measures are taken when bank 
difficulties arise, but these measures are ex-post remedies for 
short-term crises. Intelligent precautionary actions to prevent 
the deterioration of the banks' portfolios are not taken to meet 
long-run objectives of healthy financial deepening. 
The loan portfolio of the banking system is heavily 
concentrated in commerce, construction, and industry. These three 
sectors accounted for 76 percent of bank lending to non-
government sectors in 1983 (see Table 11). Commerce alone 
received 46.4 percent of total credit to non-government sectors 
in 1983, and about 53 percent of total short-term lending this 
same year. As indicated 
(agriculture, forestry, 
in a previous section, the rural sector 
and fishing) has the smallest share in 
institutional lending to non-government activities. This sector's 
share was 6.5 percent in 1978, grew to 8.3 percent in 1982, and 
then fell to 4 percent in 1983. 
Most lending to non-government sectors has been short-term. 
In fact, the term structure of the loan portfolio has tended to 
shorten in the period covered by Table 11. Short-term credit was 
between 69 and 73 percent of total lending in the years 1979 
through 1981. Its share increased to almost 77 percent in 1982, 
and then to 83 percent in 1983. This shortening of the term 
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Table 11 
Niger: Distribution of Credit to Non-government Sectors, 1979 - 1983. 
End-of-Period Balances in Millions of CFA Francs 
Term I sector 
Short-term 
Rural• 
Mining 
Industry 
Construction 
Transport 
Commerce 
Services 
Financial Inst. 
Other 
Total short-term 
of which, public & 
semi-public enterp. 
Medium-term 
Rural 
Mining 
Industry 
Construction 
Transport 
Commerce 
Services 
Financial lnst. 
Other 
Total medium-term 
of which, public ~ 
semi-public enterp. 
Long-termb 
Industry 
Construction 
Transport 
Commerce 
Services 
Total 1 ong-term 
of which, public ~ 
semi-public enterp. 
Total Credit 
of which, public & 
semi-public enterp. 
1978 
2327 
2780 
3001 
4027 
2501 
16335 
204 
399 
2588 
34612 
8099 
734 
6649 
1156 
1607 
910 
789 
241 
15 
724 
12825 
2451 
56 
25 
173 
29 
283 
222 
47720 
10772 
1979 
3244 
3947 
4636 
4560 
3690 
24418 
1502 
10 
46007 
13779 
1010 
8470 
4305 
2750 
1723 
852 
678 
19788 
5719 
47 
783 
155 
985 
817 
66780 
20315 
1980 
3084 
4101 
8733 
8445 
5498 
25910 
1959 
57730 
18560 
1392 
5251 
5469 
3034 
1772 
1636 
730 
19284 
7019 
1058 
25 
310 
1393 
1090 
78407 
26669 
Year 
1981 
3488 
1565 
8094 
12603 
6491 
28856 
1234 
62331 
22259 
2299 
6572 
5627 
3390 
1482 
2142 
917 
22429 
7223 
1487 
25 
274 
1786 
1506 
86546 
30988 
1982 
5844 
3823 
11692 
11892 
6902 
36106 
1199 
77458 
27793 
2506 
5029 
bOOO 
2625 
1040 
2494 
1053 
20747 
7340 
1568 
20 
1095 
2694 
1583 
100899 
36716 
1983 
3740 
4007 
9627 
13420 
7368 
44802 
1289 
83533 
25272 
326 
2907 
5273 
1437 
938 
2519 
1062 
14462 
4233 
1428 
15 
1119 
2562 
1458 
100557 
30963 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Ministere du Plan, Bulletin de Statistique (various issues). 
• Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. b Sectors without long-term credit excluded 
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structure of the loan portfolio was 
rural sector. Short-term lending to 
fishing represented 92 percent of 
sector in 1983. 
even more drastic for the 
agriculture, forestry and 
the loans received by this 
A final note on the portfolio composition of the banking 
system is the participation of public and semi-public 
enterprises. Their share of total non-government credit from the 
banking system bas been above 30 percent since 1979, reaching a 
maximum of 36.4 percent in 1982. Furthermore, these public and 
semi-public enterprises have practically monopolized long-term 
credit. About 80 percent of long-term lending went to these firms 
between 1979 and 1981. This share decreased to 59 and 57 percent 
in 1982 and 1983 respectively. 
This section has complemented the discussion of financial 
development carried out in section 2. The banking system of Niger 
has been increasingly servicing the government and the 
parastatals at the expense of the private sector. Reliance upon 
central bank funds and foreign borrowing has increased, while 
private sector deposits have declined. The loan portfolio of the 
banking system shows a clear urban bias, in detriment of the 
rural sector. The economic recession of the first part of the 
80's has affected the profitability of banking, increased the 
level of delinquency in the loan portfolios, and increased the 
risk associated with banking activities. As a consequence, banks 
have reduced their scale of operations, shortened their term 
structures, and accentuated the urban bias of their loan 
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portfolios. The rural sector has been particularly affected in 
this process. Not surprisingly, as the following section will 
show, infor-mal finance plays a role far more important than 
institutional financial services in rural areas. 
4. Rural Credit Outside Financial Institutions 
This section reviews, first, the characteristics of the non-
financial institutions and programs involved in or associated 
with agricultural credit. These correspond to public agencies 
that complement the functions of the CNCA on the one hand, and to 
special programs carried out under the sponsorship of foreign 
donors, on the other hand. Secondly, the role of informal (non-
institutional) finance is documented and discussed, based on the 
findings of a recent field survey carried out by Ohio State 
University&. 
4.1. Non-Financial Institutions and Programs in Agricultural 
Credit 
Two non-financial institutions stand out in the 
institutional credit network of rural Niger. The first is the 
"Union Rationale de Cooperatives" (UNC)lO, whose major role is 
the promotion and organization of cooperatives. The second is the 
"Centrale d'Approvisionnement" (CA), the institution responsible 
9 See Cuevas (1986), for a detailed report of preliminary 
findings. 
1 o Formerly the 
Cooperation" ( UNCC) . 
"Union Nationale de Credit et de la 
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for supplying inputs to farmers. The roles and functions of these 
two key non-financial institutions involved in agricultural 
credit are outlined below. 
The UNCC (now the UNC) was created in 1962 with the purpose 
of providing administrative support to cooperatives. These 
cooperatives had evolved from the "Societas Mutuelles de 
Developpement Rurale •• (SMDR), pre-cooperative organizations 
developed under the French colonial administration. These SMDRs 
were organized under mandatory membership around the production 
of peanuts, grain storage, and as a training ground for local 
leadershipll . 
A major objective of the UNCC was to provide greater central 
control of cooperatives, in an effort to reduce the corruption 
that allegedly existed at the local level. Local units were to 
report directly to the central headquarters of the UNCC. This 
management scheme continued even after 1965 when cooperatives 
were converted to locally-managed voluntary membership groups. 
"The DNCC agents continued to set the rules and make the critical 
decisions. Membership was compulsory for all those who wanted to 
market peanuts" (Hemmings, p.l). The cooperative statute of 1978 
provided greater autonomy to peasant cooperatives, however, 
membership rules are still defined by national statute. 
Cooperatives must still work with UNC (former UNCC) agents, and 
11 This historical sketch of the UNC is based on Hemmings 
( 1984). 
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must use a standardized set of organizational and accounting 
forms. 
The basic unit of the cooperative structure is the 
.. Groupement Hutualiste Villageois" (GH), based at the village-
level. Membership is open to all villagers, and in practice is 
automatic. A cooperative is comprised of five to ten GHs, and is 
designed to provide marketing services for the GM farmers. 
Delegates from the cooperatives comprise the "Union Locale de 
Cooperatives" (ULC), at the canton level. Higher level 
cooperative structures exist at the arrondissement level ("Union 
Sous-Regionale de Cooperatives", USRC), and the departmental 
level ( .. Union Regionale de Cooperatives'', URC). Finally, the UNC 
at the national level is formed by delegates from the regional 
organizations. Administratively, UNC agents exist at the canton 
and arrondissement levels, reporting directly to central UNC 
office in Niamey. 
The duties of UNC field agents are many and diverse. They 
include in principle record-keeping responsibilities for credit 
allocation, loan-repayment collection, supervision of input 
delivery and cooperative marketing, training in cooperative 
formation and agricultural production techniques. In practice, 
they play a major role in credit allocation and input 
distribution, through their work with cooperative leaders. 
However, they have little contact with individual credit 
beneficiaries, due to logistical constraints. Their record 
keeping of loans, input delivery, and loan collection are carried 
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out poorly, if at all. The Ohio State University is currently 
surveying the institutional credit network at the cooperative, 
UNC, and CNCA levels. Their upcoming report to USAID (September 
1986) will document in detail the workings of these institutions 
and organizations in the credit system. 
There are currently about 1,200 cooperatives in Niger, made 
up of some 10,000 GHs, 80 percent of which were created after 
1974, and more than one-third of which were formed after 1982 
(see table A.3 in the Appendix). Their leadership performs a very 
important role in the allocation and distribution of agricultural 
credit. They bear a large proportion of the transaction costs 
associated with lending and borrowing in the institutional credit 
network. The work by OSU referred to above should provide 
reliable estimates of the magnitudes and distribution of these 
transaction costs. 
The operations of the "Centrale d'Approvisionnement" (CA) 
are financed with credit from the CNCA, and with direct subsidies 
from the "Fonds National d'Investissement" (FNI), and the "Caisse 
de Stabilisation des Prix et de Perequation du Niger" (CSPPN). 
Input delivery to farmers is undertaken through cooperatives, 
with the assistance of UNC agents. Farmers either pay for inputs 
in cash, or inputs are delivered against a signed loan agreement 
between a cooperative member and the CNCA. The CNCA then credits 
theCA's account and debits the cooperative's account12. 
12 An extensive treatment of CA's input supply operations is 
found in Zalla, Barokas, and Hemmings (1984). 
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The main suppliers of agricultural implements to the CA are 
cooperative manufacturers located at Tahoua, Dosso and Zinder. 
Fertilizers were normally purchased from merchants importing from 
Nigeria until the border closure in April 1984. Commercial 
imports that had been discontinued in 1981 have resumed after 
this date. Additional stocks of fertilizers are provided by 
donors, usually as grants. Chemical products and spraying 
equipment are purchased abroad. 
The direct subsidies that the CA receives from the FNI and 
CSPPN do not cover its operating expenses. Until 1983, the CA's 
operating deficits were being financed with a line of credit from 
the CNCA, that in fact amounts to an additional (indirect) 
subsidy. Average levels of total (direct and indirect) subsidy to 
the CA, and thus to input users, ranged between 37 and 51 percent 
of total delivered costs to farmers. Individual input subsidy 
levels were estimated between 30 percent (urea) and 77 percent 
(most soil preparation equipment) in 1983, with a weighted 
average of 48 percent of the delivered costs of inputs. 
At present, both USAID, through conditionality clauses in 
its Agricultural Sector Development Grant, and the World Bank 
under its Structural Adjustment Program, are supporting a 
reduction in the levels of subsidy applied to farm inputs. The 
main components of the policy adjustments being pursued are: a 
maximum subsidy on any input of 50 percent of its full delivered 
cost, a restructuring of the CA, and a reformulation of input 
pricing procedures by the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
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(formerly the Ministry of Rural Development). These policy 
reforms have been gradually undertaken over the last two years. 
Productivity Projects exist or have existed in several areas 
of Niger, with the sponsorship of different donor agencies, 
notably the World Bank, the "'Fond European de Developpement" 
(FED), and more recently USAID. Of those currently in operation, 
the Maradi project (World Bank, FED) and the Niamey project 
(USAID) are the most important. A large World Bank livestock 
development project in Zinder was practically discontinued in 
1984. A common objective of all Productivity Projects (PPs) is 
the inducement of the adoption of improved inputs and 
agricultural techniques. In all cases, the operations of these 
PPs imply large subsidies to the project beneficiaries, under the 
form of technical assistance, training, and project 
administration. 
Most of these projects have usually operated through the 
CNCA under a system of advances and prefinancing, that are 
subsequently reimbursed to the CNCA by the donor agency funding 
the project. Outstanding balances of these PPs with the CNCA as 
of December 1985 amounted to about 1.1 billion CFA francs13. 
Recently however, there is a tendency for the productivity 
projects to abandon this mechanism. Instead, the donors are now 
using the branches of the CNCA merely as a window for their 
liquidity management. An example is the Niamey Productivity 
13 These debtor balances were approximately 1.6 billion CFA 
francs as of September 1983, according to CNCA-Paris (1984). 
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Project, funded by USAID, that always carries a creditor position 
with the CNCA. 
New project initiatives continue to rely upon the so called 
"stop gap•• mechanisms to channel funds to rural beneficiaries, 
given the precarious situation of the CNCA. This highly segmented 
credit delivery system is likely to remain in place until a 
restructuring of the institutional credit system. is attained. 
An interesting experiment is 
commercial banks to take on 
Cooperative League of the United 
currently underway to induce 
an agricultural clientele. The 
States (CLUSA) has signed an 
agreement with the largest private commercial bank in Niger, the 
BIAO, under which a guarantee deposit (supplied by USA.ID) is m.ade 
at BIAO against loans made to cooperatives. The credit risk is 
covered 100 percent by the guarantee fund, while BIAO provides 
only administrative services in exchange for a 5 percent net 
spread. CLUSA is in charge of selecting the cooperative 
beneficiaries of these loans, and responsible for defining the 
aaounts and maturities of the loans. At the sam.e time, CLDSA is 
engaged in intensive technical assistance and training of a 
growing number of cooperative officials. The eapbasis is on 
management of marketing services provided by the cooperatives to 
their members. The CLDSA staff is co.prised of four specialists 
and twelve trainers based in rural villages. 
Loans under the CLUSA-BIAO scheme are granted at 2 
percentage points less than the normal rates of interest 
(currently about 13 percent) . The BIAO aust undertake, along with 
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CLOSA, intensive recovery efforts and in any case wait six months 
after a loan bas been declared in arrears before availing itself 
of the guarantee. The end-use of the loans is to be decided by 
the cooperatives themselves. Current priorities are crop 
marketing and small shops. 
As of January 1986, three cooperatives of the Niamey 
department had received loans from the BIAO under this 
arrangement. The average amount of these loans was 3 million CFA 
francs, with a one year maturity. The program expects to reach a 
volume of 2 to 3 million OS dollars of outstanding loans (600 to 
900 million CFA francs) . After a two-year experiment, the BIAO 
will decide whether to take a 30 percent risk on new loans to 
cooperatives, releasing part of the guarantee fund which will 
then be devoted to increase the capital base of the cooperatives. 
4.2. Informal Finance in Rural Areasl4 
Access to institutional credit is indeed very limited in the 
rural areas of Niger. The findinss of a recent survey carried out 
by the Ohio State University indicate that about one-half of the 
cases in a random sample of rural households had not obtained a 
single loan in the last five years. Fifty-four percent of the 
households obtained at least one loan during that period, and 
only four percent had "regular" access to credit, since they 
received five or aore loans over this same period. The average 
14 This section relies upon Cuevas (1986). The OSO survey 
referred to here was undertaken in July-August 1985. 
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access rate was 22.4 percent, i.e., in an average year 22.4 
percent of the farmers obtained an institutional loan. This 
proportion however includes a large number of small seed-loans 
(primarily millet) granted in recent years. Other types of loans 
were equipment and input loans, often under the form of a 
"technology package", oxen, and cattle. A reduced number of loans 
in cash was reported by some of the respondents. 
The average amount of these institutional loans was 
approximately 16 thousand CFA francs, or about 10 percent of the 
household's average agricultural incaaets. An estimate of the 
overall ratio of agricultural credit to agricultural output can 
be obtained by multiplying the credit access rate (22.4 percent) 
by the average credit-to-income ratio found for the households 
receiving loans (9.95 percent). The estimated ratio of 
agricultural credit to agricultural output is 2.23 percent, a 
proportion very similar to the ratio of rural credit to rural 
GDP reported previously in Table 3, calculated from official 
macro-economic statistics. 
Given the low significance of institutional credit 
documented above, it was not surprising to find that informal 
financial transactions play a very important role in the 
financing of rural households. A vast majority of the heads o£ 
15 Average agricultural income was estimated at about 180 
thousand CFA francs per household, for the year preceding the 
interview. Given the average family size documented in the survey 
and the exchange rate prevailing in 1985, this estimate 
represents the equivalent of 85 US dollars per capita per year. 
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households (84 percent) had obtained loans or assistance from at 
least one source in the 12-month period preceding the interview. 
The most important source of loans or assistance was 
relatives. Over fifty percent of households in the sample had 
received aid from this source. Friends and neighbors were 
mentioned as sources of assistance in 30 percent of the cases. 
About one-fifth of the heads of households included traders and 
merchants among their sources of informal loans or assistance. 
Finally, one-half of the respondents indicated other 
miscellaneous sources of assistancelG. 
The predominant form of informal borrowing was in grains, 
primarily millet and sorghum. Almost seventy percent of the 
respondents that received some assistance received loans in 
grain. About 48 percent had obtained help in cash, and 10 percent 
of the household heads indicated other forms of informal 
borrowing, including different types of livestock17. 
The average amount of informal loans and assistance obtained 
by heads of households was estimated in about 31 thousand CFA 
francs, i.e., an amount twice as large as the average amount of 
an institutional loan. Table 12 summarizes the findings of the 
study with respect to access and magnitudes of formal and 
informal borrowing by rural households. Overall, the average 
16 The sum of the percentages exceeds 100 percent due to the 
existence of multiple sources of loans or assistance for many 
households. 
17 This time the sum exceeds 100 percent because some 
informal borrowing included more than one form. 
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Table 12 
Niger: Institut1onal and Non-Institutional Borrowing by Rural Households 
Source 
Institutional 
Non-Institutlonal 
Total 
Access 
Y. of 
Households 
22.4 
83.9 
Average 
Amount 
CFA 
15,916 
31,757 
Expected 
Borrowing 
CFA 
3,565 
26,651 
Source: Cuevas (1986) 1 based on OSU survey 1985. 
Percent of 
Agn cultural 
Income 
2.2 
16.7 
18.9 
Share of 
Each 
Source i. 
11.8 
88.2 
100.0 
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randomly selected rural household borrowed a total of 30 thousand 
CFA francs in the year preceding the survey. This amount 
represents about 19 percent of the household's average 
agricultural income. 
The OSU study also found that a large number of heads of 
households had provided informal loans or assistance to other 
members of the rural community. Two-thirds of the respondents had 
provided some kind of help to others during the twelve months 
preceding the survey. Beneficiaries of this assistance were 
primarily relatives. Half of the loans or assistance were 
provided in kind, about 22 percent in cash and 28 percent in a 
combination of both. 
In summary, informal transactions between rural households 
are a very important mechanism of transmission and reallocation 
of liquidity. In a twelve-month period, more than eighty percent 
of the rural households received some sort of loan or assistance, 
whereas at least two-thirds of the same households engaged in 
some form of informal lending or provision of assistance to 
others. Cash transactions were important, even though in-kind 
transactions (primarily grains) were predominant. This should not 
be surprising since in-kind transactions are likely to be the 
least costly type of transaction at the village level. Informal 
borrowing and lending may explain an important part of the use of 
temporary surpluses generated in rural activities. 
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5. Infrastructure for Rural Development and Pricing Policies 
The institutional infrastructure associated with rural 
development in Niger relates primarily to input supply, marketing 
of agricultural commodities, and irrigation development. Other 
less developed areas of support to rural activities are 
agricultural research ("Institute de Recherche Agricola du 
Niger", INRAN), and extension and promotion ("Service de 
1 'Agriculture" , the UNC, and the "Service de 1' Animation'') . Given 
their direct connections with the credit network, the 
institutions involved in farm input delivery (the CA and UNC) 
were described and analyzed in the previous section. Therefore, 
this section will present an overview of the institutional 
infrastructure associated with the marketing of agricultural 
products, and with irrigation development. A discussion of 
pricing policies for major crops is presented at the end of the 
section. 
5.1. Agricultural Marketing18 
A dualistic food grain marketing system exists in Niger. 
Several parastatals coexist with private traders throughout the 
country for the marketing of millet, sorghum, rice, cowpeas, and 
peanuts. The ''Office des Produits Vivriers du Niger" (OPVN) is 
the official cereal marketing agency, in charge of organizing the 
marketing system, aa.intaining reserve stocks, and managing food 
18 This section draws upon material in Zalla, Barokas, 
Hemmings ( 1984) , and the .li!:J~oi:.di,...nit..!tlf-......l!P~a:..~J."=.;O~aa:o.r.lll!!am.II!L-...._,fii,Ausus~e...,s..,s=•=~ ...n ...... t'---~o.,.f........,G=-r...,a,..i...,n_ 
Marketing in Niger (1983). 
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aid. The OPVN carries out a grain purchasing campaign every year, 
through cooperatives and local officials. Purchasing and selling 
prices are established by decree each year just prior to the 
harvest. 
The marketed proportion of millet and sorghum, the main food 
staples, is relatively small. 
between 10 and 35 percent of 
Estimates of this proportion vary 
total production. Of the marketed 
output, OPVN 
the source 
Hemmings, p. 
purchases ''between 18 and 63 percent, depending on 
of the estimate and the year" (Zalla, Barokas, 
35). However, the OPVN is in charge of all food aid 
imports, and commercial grain imports. This gi vas the agency a 
stronger regulatory power than that implied by its participation 
in domestic purchases. 
Two other parastatals participate in the marketing of 
agricultural products. The "Societe Nationale d'Arachide" 
(SONARA) is in charge of the marketing of peanuts and COWPeas. It 
operates in a way very similar to that of the OPVN, dealing with 
two traditional export crops. "Riz du Niger" (RINI) is 
responsible for rice marketing. RINI is indeed an intermediary 
between the OPVN and rice producers. It is in charge of 
processing the rice it purchases from farmers and then sells to 
the OPVN at prices established by the latter. 
Private traders operate parallel to the official marketing 
system in all commodities referred to above. According to Zalla, 
Barokas and Hemmings ( 1984:) private markets have many structural 
characteristics of perfectly competitive markets. There is no 
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evidence however about the magnitudes and competitiveness o~ 
trade margins in the di~ferent stages o~ the marketing chain. 
Nevertheless, some public officials tend to believe that 
collusion and other distortions predominate in private markets in 
rural areas. 
5.2. Irrigation Development 
The development of irrigated areas is a natural concern in 
Niger, where rainfall is scarce and highly unstable. Of~icial 
estimates o~ potentially irrigated land are on the order o~ 200 
thousand hectaresll. The realization of this potential, along 
with the adoption of improved techniques could increase 
agricultural production dramatically. 
According to a USAID report, as of 1984, less than 9 
thousand hectares had been developed ~or irrigation. Irrigated 
land had been falling out of production about half as fast as it 
was being added, thus net additions to the total area under 
irrigation were limited. This report attributes this lack of 
success to technical design and management problems. Management 
problems appeared to stem from a lack of a sense of private 
ownership on the part of the farmers, compromising maintenance, 
and from the competing demand for labor by non-irrigated farming 
in peak seasons. 
18 Estimates reported in USAID 
may have modified the magnitude or 
these estimates. 
(1984). The drought of 1984 
at least the reliability of 
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The "Office National des .Amenagements Bydro-Agricoles" 
(ONABA) is the parastatal in charge of managing the majority of 
the irrigated perimeters. It provides machinery services, 
maintenance of the irrigation equipment, and performs input 
supply and extension services. Farmers are required to pay for 
these services at harvest time. The usual way of collecting these 
payments was through the requirement that farmers sell to RINI at 
the official prices. 
OMAHA has been training cooperative members in the 
management of irrigated perimeters, with the purpose of gradually 
transferring maintenance responsibilities to the farmers. At the 
same time, different donor agencies are devoting efforts to 
rehabilitate or develop new irrigated areas. 
5.3. Pricing Policies 
Official prices are established each year by the Council of 
Ministers, under the advice of an inter-ministerial committee. 
These are the prices implemented by the marketing parastatals, 
described above, during their purchasing campaigns. During these 
campaigns {normally 4 to 9 months), private trading is 
technically illegal. 
The official producer prices for the major agricultural 
commodities in recent years are reported in Table 13. The Joint 
Program Assessment of Grain Marketing {Government of Niger and 
USAID, 1983) indicated that until 1982 official prices were 
substantially and consistently below the prices paid to producers 
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Table 13 
Niger: Offic1al Producer Pr1ces of Selected Agr1cultural Commodities, 
1979/80 - 1984/85 
Commod1ty 
Millet 
Sorghum 
Rice (paddy) 
Cowpeas 
Peanuts (unshelled) 
Cotton 
1979-
-1980 
40 
40 
55 
45 
75 
62 
1980-
-1981 
Prices 
50 
so 
55 
45 
75 
62 
in 
Crop Year 
1981- 1982-
-1982 -1983 
CFA francs per 
70 eo 
60 70 
70 85 
90 85 
as 100 
eo 120 
1983-
-1984 
kilogram 
eo 
70 
85 
90 
100 
120 
Sources: BCEAO, Statistiques Economiques et Honetaires, <Nov. 1985); 
Zalla, Barokas, Hemmings (1984); 
Hinistere de 1 'Agriculture et l'Elevage (unpublished materials). 
1984-
-1985 
100 
100 
85 
120 
110 
120 
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in the parallel private market. Table 14 shows the ratios of 
official to open (parallel) market prices for the four main food 
crops. Until 1982, official producer prices were on average 
between 53 and 61 percent of open market prices depending on the 
crop. Starting in the 1982/83 season, however, pricing policies 
for these crops became more aggressive, as seen in Table 14. 
Official prices were as high or slightly higher than private 
market prices for millet and sorghum. The corresponding ratios 
for rice and cowpeas, although improved after 1982 with respect 
to previous years, still remain well below the parity level. 
Most observers believe that production of millet and sorghum 
in Niger are inelastic to prices. Since official prices are 
announced just prior to harvest, it cannot be expected that they 
will have any effect on production decisions. In fact, official 
prices are intended to reflect demand and supply conditions at 
the time of harvest rather than serve as incentives to increase 
production. However, several studies cited in Zalla, Barokas and 
Hemmings (1984) have found a positive and significant supply 
response of millet and sorghum to relative prices. 
At present, policy reforms are being implemented in order to 
liberalize grain marketing and pricing policies. These policies 
involve reducing the role of official marketing agencies in grain 
trade, rationalization of food reserves, and improving market 
information, and drawing private traders into the official grain 
marketing chain through a bid and tender system. 
Crop 
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Table 14 
Niger: Official Producer Pr1ces as a Proportion of Open Market 
Producer Prices of Major Food Crops•, 1979/80 - 1983/84 
1979-
-1980 
1980-
-1991 
Crop Year 
1981-
-1982 
1982-
-1983 
1983-
-1984b 
7. 
-----------------------------
------- ------- ------- -------
Millet 70 51 63 102 104 
Sorghum 63 46 65 95 97 
Rice 55 47 56 72 75 
Cowpeas 64 36 59 62 69 
Source: Joint Program Assessment of Grain Marketing in Niger (1983). Open 
market prices were calculated assuming a 65 !. mark-up from farmgate to the 
crop-year average retail price in Niamey. 
• <Official price I Open market price) * 100. 
b Calculated 1n this study using data from Zalla, Barokas, Hemmings <1984). 
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6. Key Financial Institutions and an Overview of Rural Finance 
This final section reviews the functioning and performance 
of the two key institutions involved in rural finance in Niger. 
First, the "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola" (CNCA) is 
practically the only financial institution supplying credit to 
the agricultural sector in the last two decades. The current poor 
financial situation of the CNCA represents an important 
constraint to the implementation of agricultural development 
programs. The treatment of this institution in this report relies 
upon and summarizes a recent study by Masini and Graham (1986), 
undertaken as part of the on-going OSU-USAID rural finance 
project in Niger. 
The second part of this section will discuss the operations 
of the "Caisse Nationale d'Epargne" (CNE), the only financial 
institution with a truly national scope of activity. The CNE 
represents a key potential basis for the development of financial 
services in rural areas. The section concludes with some final 
remarks on the current state and the prospects of rural financial 
markets in Niger. 
6.1. The "Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricola", CNCA 
The CNCA was created in 1967 within the framework of the 
sectoral specialization adopted in shaping Niger's financial 
system. In this framework, the institution was empowered to carry 
out any financial operation that could benefit economic activity 
in rural areas. The CNCA emerged as a separate institution from 
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the division of the "Union Nationale de Credit et de la 
Cooperation"' (UNCC) into two bodies, the CNCA and the UNCC 
itself, subsequently restructured as the UNC20. 
A total of 109 employees worked in the CNCA at the end of 
the 1984-85 exercise. Forty-five employees were in the central 
office, sixty were stationed in a total of five branches21 , and 
four were on external training programs. The distribution of 
personnel by level and their average salaries in the most recent 
period (1984-85) were the following: 
Category 
Subordinate staff 
Executive staff 
Middle management 
Officers 
Number 
33 
24 
41 
11 
Average salary 
( CFA F /year) 
406,136 
696,951 
1,261,035 
2,105,559 
Even after the credit function of the DNCC was passed on to 
the CNCA, strong administrative and functional links between the 
two institutions remained in place. The CNCA, moreover, continues 
to rely heavily on the parastatal "O£fices et Societas d'Economie 
Mixte" (0SEMs)22 both as a device to channel credit to farmers 
20 See section 4 for a description and discussion of the 
functions of the DNC. 
21 Niamey, Dosso, Tahoua, Maradi, and Zinder. 
22 For example, OPVN, "Riz du Niger••, ONAHA, SONARA, or the 
"Central d' Approvisionnement'' (CA). See section 4. 
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and to perform some critical functions in identifying, selecting 
and monitoring its own direct customers. Transferring the credit 
function to the CNCA did not automatically create the appropriate 
banking skills in the new institution, nor were the extension and 
monitoring skills of the OSEMs improved. 
The CNCA, given its reduced staff, could not afford to 
establish direct contact with its ultimate borrowers in the rural 
areas. Therefore, forced to work through other institutions to 
reach the final borrower, it could not develop the necessary 
banking skills for an efficient performance. This situation was 
not improved by the emergence of the Productivity Projects (PPs). 
The goals and operational structure of these projects make it 
very difficult for an institution like the CNCA to participate 
directly in the loan evaluation and loan administration 
procedures where these projects operate. This effect is 
compounded when the project can count on its own lines of credit. 
In short, the CNCA becomes a mere administrative conduit to 
channel funds with no participation in the loan decision making 
process. 
As a consequence of the limitations described above, the 
CNCA has very little control over the resources it lends. This 
became evident in 1981-82 when the institution tried to enforce a 
more aggressive loan repayment policy. Borrowers managed to 
divert the sources from which their loans were drawn towards 
other financial institutions (e.g., the BDRN), thus precipitating 
the CNCA into a deeper financial crisis. 
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In the credit distribution system such as the one that links 
the CNCA to the OSEHs and the PPs, the identification of lending 
opportunities, risk assessment and client selection, and related 
administrative procedures are undertaken by the OSEMs and the 
PPs. Under this scheme the financial entity is a mere 
administrative device completely subordinated to the purpose of 
channelling credit to predefined uses. Furthermore, these end-
uses follow the priorities of a development agency whose task is 
to stimulate the adoption of specific technologies with the aim 
of increasing output. Such an approach does not provide the 
incentives to develop within the financial institution the 
appropriate skills needed to administer a loan portfolio and 
develop healthy bank-client relationships. 
The structure of liabilities and capital of the CNCA is 
reported in table A.4 of the Appendix. The performance of 
selected liabilities is shown in Table 15 highlighting the 
behavior of funds borrowed in domestic and external financial 
markets. There is a large variability of growth rates among 
different types of liabilities and over time, denoting extreme 
instability and lack of diversification of funding sources. 
The predominant sources of funds are either the government 
or external donors. Central bank rediscount lines accounted for 
44.7 percent of total borrowing, 
covered in Table 15. Fixed-term 
on average, over the period 
deposits (mostly from the 
Treasury) and external lines of credit from international donors 
accounted respectively for 22.8 percent and 20.1 percent, on 
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Table 15 
CNCA : Selected Liabilities. Annual Rates of Change and 
Composition at Year End, 1979/80 - 1983/84 
Central Bank 
Checking Accounts 
Current Accounts 
Banks & Correspondents 
Fixed Term Deposits 
Ext. Lines of Credit 
Total 
Central Bank 
Checking Accounts 
Current Accounts 
Bamks & Correspondents 
Fixed Term Deposits 
Ext. Lines of Credit 
1979-
-1980 
X 
4.01 
208.20 
64.18 
236.64 
126.52 
270.20 
60.20 
42.5 
2.7 
1.7 
4.9 
30.2 
17.9 
1980-
-1981 
Y. 
-0.73 
5.80 
352.02 
54.58 
-17.48 
39.01 
10.30 
Year 
1981-
-1982 
X 
1982-
-1983 
Y. 
Rates of Change 
15.32 67.51 
273.52 -23.03 
-45.81 -4.66 
-24.39 -66.43 
17.46 -9.51 
-10.27 18.52 
-9.70 49.30 
Percentage Composition 
38.3 40.2 54.8 
2.6 B.B 5.5 
7.0 3.5 2.7 
6.9 4.7 1.3 
22.6 24.3 17.8 
22.6 18.5 17.9 
1983-
-1984 
-25.17 
-15.90 
27.75 
-100.00 
-8.87 
13.73 
14.30 
47.9 
5.4 
4.1 
18.9 
23.7 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Hasin1 and Graham (1986). 
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average, of total borrowing by the CNCA. At the end of the period 
1983-84, government and external donors represented about 91 
percent of CNCA's borrowed funds. 
When the structure of liabilities of a financial institution 
is dominated by government rediscount lines of credit or 
international donor funds, all loan procedures and administrative 
practices are designed to favor borrowers' interests23. Detailed 
farm-budget studies are emphasized, while rigorous analyses of 
loan repayment probabilities, and loan recovery procedures are 
minimized. 
The portfolio of financial assets of the CNCA consists 
almost exclusively of loans and overdrafts. The average annual 
growth of the portfolio between 1979/80 and 1983/84 was 17.6 
percent (including doubtful loans net of provisions). The average 
rate of growth over the same period, excluding doubtful loans, 
was 16.9 percent for overdrafts, 23.1 percent for short-term 
loans and 25.7 percent for medium-term loans (see table A.5 in 
the Appendix). In 1983/84, seventy percent of the CNCA loan 
portfolio consisted of overdrafts and short-term loans, while 30 
percent was comprised of medium-term loans. 
As shown in Table 16, overdrafts fall into five main groups. 
Until 1983/84 crop loans consisted mostly of loans to OPVN and, 
to a lesser extent, to "Riz du Niger' and SONARA. Input supply 
loans were granted mostly to the "Central d'Approvisionnement"; 
2 3 A feature that Masini and Graham refer to as ''borrower-
domination" . 
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Table 16 
CNCA : Distribution of Loans by Beneficiaries, 1984 and 1985• 
Nuaber of Accounts Aaount Outstanding Doubtful Loans 
Beneficiaries !million CFA f) !million CFA f) 7. of Outstanding 
1984 19!!5 1984 1985 1984 1985 1984 1985 
Kediua-tera 
Cooperatives 1160 1160 2299.4 2531.8 31.4 362.3 1.37 14.31 
OSEl'ls 5 5 596.3 383.0 
State 1016.1 338.2 300.2 298.3 45.13 46.54 
Short-tera 
Cooperatives 1548 1548 208.7 256.3 10.8 256.3 5.13 100.0 
Individuals 3396 3390 202.0 143.5 74.8 69.7 37.13 48.58 
Overdrafts 
Crop loans 2 2522.2 150.9 
Input supply 5 5 2629.0 3430.3 
Prefinancing 16 16 762.9 567.1 
Advances ONAHA and AHAs 43 43 2072.7 2390.9 
Other advances on c.a. 111 111 2164.8 3084.9 189.3 220.0 8.74 7.13 
Total 9506 9505 15199.4 13918.0 606.7 1206.7 3.99 8.67 
Source: Masini and Srahaa. 
• As of Septeaber 30 of each year. 
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prefinancing loans mainly to Productivity Projects24; advances to 
ONABA and directly to some "Amenagements Bydro-Agricoles" (ABA). 
This situation reflects the fact that overdrafts only benefit 
farmers indirectly. The customers of the CNCA in this case are 
neither cooperatives nor individual borrowers, but government 
agencies with various functions in the rural sector of Niger. 
On the other hand, short-term loans are concentrated on 
cooperatives and individuals. They accounted for 52 percent of 
the number but only 3 percent of the value of total loans 
outstanding in 1984/85. The main stated end-uses of these loans 
are the financing of land preparation, farm equipment, cattle 
fattening, marketing of horticultural products and production 
campaigns in irrigated areas. 
Medium-term loans represented 46 percent of the number and 
28 percent of the value of total loans outstanding at the end of 
1984/85. An important although decreasing proportion of these 
loans is accounted for by the consolidation of loans granted to 
crop marketing agencies, and by one loan granted to the 
government, on which no interest is accruing according to the 
notes to the financial statement for 1983/84. The rest of the 
medium-term portfolio is represented by loans to cooperatives and 
to individuals. The main end-use of loans to cooperatives was 
farm equipment. For individuals, major stated end-uses were 
orchard production, cattle raising and seed storage. 
24 Prefinancing corresponds to credit granted as an advance 
on the expected disbursement of lines of credit obtained from 
external donors or the "Fond National d'Investissement". 
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In summary, retail lending (loans to cooperatives and 
individuals) represents only one-fourth of the total value of the 
portfolio of the CNCA, and is concentrated in short and medium-
term loans. With the exception of medium-term loans to 
cooperatives, the average loan amount is so small that it is 
unlikely that the net interest margin is sufficient to cover the 
operating costs of handling these loans. 
It is clear that the quality of the loan portfolio of the 
CNCA has been steadily deteriorating over the years. The CNCA 
reports as doubtful only a proportion of those loans granted to 
individuals and cooperatives, because it considers all other 
loans granted to or guaranteed by the government as secure25. 
Under this narrow definition of non-performing loans, only 8.7 
percent of the total portfolio was considered as doubtful and 
adjusted accordingly with increased loan loss provisions at the 
end of 1984/85. A more realistic appraisal of the proportion of 
doubtful-loans in the portfolio should consider a substantial 
part of the loans to parastatals as equally doubtful as those 
written off for cooperatives and individuals. Thus the misleading 
8.7 percent estimate could be adjusted upwards to a ratio close 
to 20 percent of total loans outstanding. This is still a lower-
bound estimate for delinquency, since the incidence of non-
performing loans is no doubt higher than the conservative 
provisions for bad debt made by the CNCA. 
25 For example no prov1s1on for loan 
for loans to the OSEMs, even though many 
clearly non-performing. 
losses has been made 
of these loans are 
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This poor loan repayment performance undermines the 
stability of the institution in several ways. On the one hand, 
the limited loan turnover creates liquidity problems for the 
CNCA. On the other hand, the increased cost of funds prompted by 
the liquidity squeeze, the lost interest income and the loss in 
the value of assets seriously compromise the profitability of the 
institution. 
The assessment of the CNCA's profitability relies 
necessarily upon the existing accounting evidence. As suggested 
above, accounting procedures in the institution are questionable 
in many respects, particularly in what relates to loan loss 
provisions. These limitations must be kept in mind in the 
discussion that follows. 
Table 17 reports the main financial indicators of 
profitability for the period 1979/80 through 1983/84. Panel A of 
this table indicates that the CNCA manages to show a positive net 
return on its capital and reserves, usually an index of overall 
efficiency. However, there is a negative trend both in the profit 
margin and in the gross return on capital and reserves over the 
four accounting periods included in Table 17. 
Several factors help explain the declining trend indicated 
above. First, overdrafts which bear the highest average return 
are still dominant in the composition of the portfolio, but lost 
ground during 1983/84 (see table A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix). 
Secondly, the gross return on mediua-term loans fell sharply in 
1983/84 because according to a note in the annual report-
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Table 17 
CNCA : Selected Financial Ratios, 1979180 - 1983184 
A. Return on Capital and Reserves 
Bross Return on Cap. & Res.• 
Profit Margi nb 
Net Return on Cap. & Res.c 
B. Return on Financial Assets 
Gross Return on Fin. Assets 
Charges on borrowings I 
Ave. Financial assets 
Provisions for Loan 
Losses I Ave. F1n. Assets 
Operational Costs I 
Ave. Financial Assets 
Extraordinary Items I 
Ave. Financial Assets 
Net Return on Fin. Assets 
Source: Masini and Graham <1986). 
1979-
-1980 
68.6 
21.0 
14.4 
11.5 
6.0 
0.9 
2.0 
-0.2 
2.4 
1980-
-1981 
71.6 
11.8 
8.4 
11. 1 
5.9 
1.9 
2.7 
(1.7 
1 ~ • v 
Year 
1981-
-1982 
85.6 
8.4 
7 "j 
'L 
12.8 
8. 1 
1.2 
2.3 
-0.2 
1.1 
• Income from financial operations I Ave. capital and reserves. 
b Net profit I Income from financial operations. 
c Net profit I Average cap1tal and reserves. 
1982-
-1983 
'I ,, 
106.4 
9.0 
9.6 
14.6 
9.8 
1.5 
2. 1 
0. 1 
1.3 
1983-
-1984 
I. 
79.9 
9.8 
7,9 
12.6 
6.3 
2.3 
1.8 
-0.4 
1.2 
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interest on a loan to the government was not accrued. Finally, 
non-interest bearing financial assets increased their share over 
total financial assets during 1983/84 to create a better 
liquidity position (see table A.5 in the Appendix). 
The incidence of interest costs and the incidence of 
provisions for bad losses generally increased throughout the 
period covered in Table 17. The incidence of operating costs 
however shows a negative trend. Even though personnel costs 
increased steadily until 1982/83, the institution did not engage 
in excessive expenditure and controlled effectively its other 
operating costs. The incidence of extraordinary items is 
associated with the need to take into consideration accounting 
items that escaped appropriate reporting in previous periods. 
This reflects the difficulty of measuring the perforaance of the 
CNCA. Factors that tend to increase this item are the 
inefficiency of the CNCA's inforaation system and the 
controversies surrounding the relationships between the CNCA and 
some of its parastatal clients. 
In summary, the various measures of profitability set forth 
in Table 17 show a trend of declining profits in recent years, 
reflecting the deterioration of the CNCA's portfolio. These 
findings are in fact even more disturbing since actual profits, 
as opposed to accounting profits, are no doubt non-existent. All 
estimates of profitability discussed above are based on "accrued' 
interest, a conventional accounting tera that considers all the 
hypothetical interest earnings for delinquent loans to the OSEMs 
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and the PPs as revenue, since it is accruing in the books of the 
institution. If, instead one were to use actual interest payments 
to estimate interest revenue, then the CNCA would be recording 
increasing losses rather than declining profits. 
''The deteriorating performance of the CNCA in recent years 
can be largely traced to poor loan management procedures and 
practices, and to an operational philosophy that prevented the 
institution from maturing sufficiently to play an autonomous role 
as a true intermediary- in the rural development of Niger" (Masini 
and Graham, p. 38). By forcing the CNCA to operate primarily 
through other organizations, the financial viability of the 
institution has been seriously compromised. 
6.2. The "Caisse Nationale d'Epa.rgne" and Rural Savings 
The "Caisse Nationale d'Epargne" (CNE) was officially 
created in 1970, as a legal successor of the "Caisse d'Epargn.e 
Postale du Niger" which existed since the independence.The CNE is 
defined as a public, autonomous, financial institution. It 
operates primarily through the branches of the "Office des Postes 
et Telecommunications'' (OPT). The CNE has practically no lending 
functions, since all deposit funds are channelled to the Treasury 
or deposited at the BDRN (a public bank) . The CNE' s own funds can 
be invested only in real estate or in government securities and 
shares. 
Funds are mobilized from the public in the fo~ of savings 
deposits, about 96 percent of total balances at the end of 1984, 
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and retirement accounts (4 percent). Table 18 shows the behavior 
of outstanding deposit balances from 1971 until 1984. Balances 
increased during this period at an average annual rate of 12 
percent, while the number of accounts grew on average at 18.5 
percent per year. Both growth rates slowed down after 1981, most 
likely as a result of the overall economic recession of the early 
80's. The average amount per account also grew steadily until 
1981, stagnating in the period 1982 - 1984 (see Table 19). In 
real terms however, the average size of balance has dropped an 
average of ten percent per year between 1981 and 1984. 
Deposits are paid a nominal interest rate of 7.5 percent per 
annum. The effective rate is substantially lower, as interest 
accrues only starting the first or the sixteenth day of the 
month. In fact, the implicit effective rate paid on deposits in 
the years 1981 through 1983 can be estimated between 3.72 and 4 
percent per annum26. During 1985 the CNE was earning 9.25 percent 
on its account with the Treasury (about 30 percent of its 
financial assets), and 11.25 percent on a fixed-term deposit with 
the BDRN (representing the other 70 percent of its financial 
assets). Effective financial earnings are affected by the 
effective dates at which the net financial balances between the 
CNE and the OPT are settled. 
The CNE operates through 42 full service branches of the OPT 
and the mobile units currently run by the OPT in eight regional 
26 Estimates based on very condensed profit and loss 
statements available for these years. Average balances were 
estimated assuming that they grow linearly during the year. 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
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Table 18 
CNE : Number of Deposit Accounts and Deposit Balances, 
1971 - 1984 
Number of Accounts Outstanding Balances 
Number at 
year-end 
11,667 
12,120 
12,763 
13,639 
14,752 
15,832 
16,950 
19,642 
22,605 
26,757 
32\505 
38,080 
44,896 
51,605 
Increase 
i. 
3.91 
3.88 
5.31 
6.86 
8.16 
7.32 
7.06 
15.88 
15.09 
18.37 
21.48 
17. 15 
17.90 
14.94 
Amount at 
year-end 
CFA F<OOO> 
109\696 
112,408 
120,345 
145 '084 
167\484 
194,180 
231\100 
287,273 
379,585 
533,236 
667,686 
788,300 
920,718 
992,474 
Incre>ase 
'I ,, 
14.30 
2.47 
7.06 
21.16 
14.87 
15.94 
19.01 
24.31 
32.13 
40.48 
25.21 
18.06 
16.80 
7.79 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CNE, Annual Report, 1983 and 1984. 
1975 
Nuaber of Participating 
OPT Branches 37 
Deposit Accounts 
Hu1ber of Accounts 14752 
Duts.Balance, CFA!OOOl 167.5 
Ave. Balance, CFAlOOOl 11.4 
Deposit Transactions 
Number 
A1ount 1 CFAIOOOl 
Ave. Aaount 1 CFAIOOOl 
Withdrawals 
Nu1ber 
A1ount, CFA!OOOl 
Ave. Aaount, CFAIOOOl 
Retire1ent Accounts 
Nuaber of Accounts 
Duts.Balance, CFA!OOOJ 
Ave. Balance, CFA!OOOl 
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Table 19 
CNE : Deposits and Retire•ent Accounts. Average Balances and 
Nuaber and A1ounts of Transactions, 1975 - 1984 
Year 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
37 40 41 41 41 41 
15832 16950 19042 22605 26757 32502 
194.2 211.1 287.3 339.6 533.2 667.7 
12.3 13.7 14.6 16.8 19.9 20.5 
33725 45395 
813.5 1097.3 
24.1 24.2 
36997 52486 
681.5 985.8 
18.4 18.8 
195 235 315 
4272 6141 9736 
21.9 26.1 30.9 
1982 1983 1984 
42 42 42 
38080 44896 51605 
788.3 920.7 992.5 
20.7 20.5 19.2 
51509 59224 63281 
1459.8 1645.8 1812.0 
28.3 27.8 28.6 
b7143 80767 8b059 
1366.7 1551.3 1751.2 
20.4 19.2 20.4 
us 518 896 
14882 26843 46432 
32.0 51.8 51.8 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CNE, Annual Report !various years!. 
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circuits. Employees of the OPT in the post offices act as CNE 
agents, except in a few branches where there are personnel 
devoted exclusively to savings operations. It is estimated that 
in 1985 some 50 OPT employees worked full or part-time for the 
CNE, while the CNE has its own staff of 33 people located in the 
Niamey headquarters. The CNE compensates the OPT for its support 
a flat fee of 1.25 million CFA francs per year. 
Despite the support received from the OPT, the CNE has 
recorded in recent years administrative costs that were as high 
as its interest costs. Table 20 summarizes the operating expenses 
and revenues of the CNE as a percent of estimated average annual 
deposit balances for the years 1981 through 1983. Despite 
relatively high administration costs (on average 4 percent of 
outstanding balances), the CNE managed to earn operating 
surpluses in 1982 and 1983. It must be kept in mind however, that 
the administration costs indicated in Table 20 do not include the 
costs of OPT employees who handle CNE operations in the post-
office network, in excess of the 1.25 million CFA that CNE pays 
to the OPT. 
The OPT estimate of about 50 employees devoted totally or 
partially to supporting CNE operations suggests a low level of 
productivity per employee. In 1985 the number of first and 
subsequent deposits, withdrawals and passbook deposits for 
interest calculations represented the equivalent of 12,017 hours 
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Table 20 
CNE : Revenue, Expend1ture, and Operat1ng Surplus as a Proport1on 
of Outstand1ng Balances, 1981 - 1983• 
Revenue, as 'l. of Average Balancesb 
Expend1tures, as i. of Average Balances 
Interest payments 
Adm1n1strat1on expenses 
Total 
Operat1ng Surplus, as i. of 
Average Balances 
1981 
i. 
7.13 
3. 72 
3.62 
7.32 
-0.19 
Year 
1982 
i. 
9.41 
4.00 
4.52 
8.52 
0.89 
1983 
'l. 
9.44 
3.78 
8.52 
7.56 
1. 88 
Source: Calculated based on data 1n CNE 1 Annual Reports, 1981 through 1983. 
• Includes depos1ts and ret1rement accounts. 
b Average balances were est1mated assum1ng they grow l1nearly dur1nq the 
year. 
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of work27. This amounts to only 12 full-time employees, assuming 
211 working days a year, a 60 percent ratio between effective and 
total time worked, and that all CNE operations took place in OPT 
branches. The estimate of 50 employees, although it includes 
part-time dedication, appears somehow exaggerated. On the other 
hand, even taking the more "efficient" estimate of 12 full-time 
employees per year, at an average personnel cost of 500 thousand 
CFA francs per year, the OPT support to CNE would amount to 6 
million CFA francs, instead of the 1.25 million that the OPT 
receives from the CNE per year. 
In summary, the CNE appears as a relatively healthy 
financial operation, partially because of the support received 
from the OPT in excess of its annual compensation. This non-
compensated support amounts to at least 4.75 million CFA francs 
per year, about 0.5 percent of average annual balances {using 
1984 data). On the other hand, the CNE is the only supplier of 
deposit services in rural areas. It operates with very small 
accounts and a clientele difficult to reach and service. The 
subsidy implicit in the support received from the OPT appears 
very moderate and more than justified to achieve this objective. 
This subsidy is covering the transaction costs that otherwise 
would have prevented rural depositors from access to the deposit 
services offered by the CNE/OPT network. 
27 Estimate obtained using time-per-operation standards of 
the "Conference de !'Administration des Postes et 
Telecommunications des Etats de !'Afrique de !'Ouest". 
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The recent survey carried out by OSU found little savings 
activity at the farm household level (see Cuevas, 1986). However. 
the CNE was the single most important institution where deposits 
were kept. Furthermore, the existence of a demand for safe 
instruments of financial savings is suggested by the use of 
"money keepers •• documented in this survey, as well as the 
holdings of physical forms of savings. According to a survey of 
the CNE, farmers represent only 1.3 percent of its depositors. 
However, rural depositors are not limited to agricultural 
producers. On the contrary, the greatest potential for increased 
rural savings in an initial stage may exist among the non-farm 
rural population. The CNE/OPT network should be looked upon as a 
key potential basis for the development of financial 
intermediation in the rural areas of Niger. 
6.3. Concluding Remarks 
The overall picture of rural financial markets in Niger is 
not very promising. There is a complete segmentation in the 
provision of financial services in rural areas. One institution, 
the CNCA, has the responsibility of delivering agricultural 
credit without offering deposit facilities to its customers. The 
other institution, the CNE, provides deposit services to the 
rural population without engaging in lending activities of any 
sort. 
The poor performance and precarious situation of the CNCA 
have induced increased segmentation in the agricultural credit 
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system_ Existing as well as newly created agricultural 
development projects tend to establish their own credit delivery 
systems for each individual program. The CNCA has been reduced to 
serving as a mere window for the management of project accounts. 
Even this passive role is being diverted to other institutions in 
an effort to induce commercial banks into rural finance (e.g., 
the CLUSA-BIAO program). These "stop-gap" measures imply even 
further fragmentation of the financial system. Moreover, they 
represent a step away from the building of a diversified, 
reliable and viable financial system for rural areas. 
The provision of deposit services is particularly limited in 
the rural areas of Niger. Both institutional and non-
institutional savings appear to be limited. However, there is an 
important informal financial activity at the village level. Most 
rural households engage in informal financial transactions, thus 
suggesting the existence of temporary surpluses at the household 
level. The potential role for improved financial intermediation 
depends upon the lack of coincidence of temporary surpluses and 
temporary deficits, both geographically and over time. In other 
words, the potential for "institutionalization" of these informal 
financial transactions is a function of the covariance of 
surpluses. Direct informal financial arrangements are efficient 
and least costly when surplus units and deficit units coincide in 
the same place (i.e., the same village) at the same point in 
time. However, when these transactions must be performed across 
long distances, or when liquidity must be "stored" through time 
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in some form before an informal loan or assistance can be 
granted, then informal transactions become more costly to perform 
and a more formal vehicle for financial intermediation may be 
justified. 
The foregoing discussion indicates the complementarity 
between rural development initiatives in the non-financial sector 
and the improvement of rural financial markets. Diversification 
in agricultural production and in rural economic activities in 
general reduce the covariance of surpluses. Deficit units tend to 
exist at the same time that surpluses are being generated 
elsewhere. Surpluses being produced today from "counter-
seasonal .. cropping along the Niger river are needed tomorrow by 
rainfed farming. In summary, the demand for financial 
intermediation develops as a result of improvements in the non-
financial side of the rural economy. Successful rural development 
initiatives in Niger will in fact be creating the need for 
improved financial intermediation. If no steps are taken in the 
direction of building a healthy financial system for rural areas, 
self-sustained and steady growth of the rural economy is not 
likely to be attained. 
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Table A.1 
Niger: Structure of Production by Sector of Origin 
1978 - 1985 1 in Percent 
1978 
Rural Sector 46.3 
Agriculture 24.3 
Livestock 17.1 
Forestry ~ Fish. 4.8 
Mining 10.3 
Industry & Energy 4.6 
Construction f.t 
Public Works 4.8 
Commerce, Transport 
~ Services 23.4 
Government 6.3 
SDP at Factor Cost 95.7 
Import Taxes & 
Duties 4.3 
SDP at Market 
Prices 
Source: Toh <1986). 
100.0 
1979 
42.6 
21.8 
16.3 
4.5 
14.2 
4.4 
5.6 
23.3 
5.7 
95.7 
4.3 
100.0 
1980 
42.5 
21.9 
16.6 
3.4 
12.6 
4.1 
6.0 
23.4 
6.3 
94.9 
5. 1 
100.0 
Year 
1981 1982 
45.7 
22.5 
17.6 
3.4 
8.8 
4.6 
4.5 
25.0 
6.7 
95.3 
4.7 
100.0 
46.6 
24.6 
16.8 
3.4 
7.7 
5.0 
3.9 
24.8 
7. 1 
95.1 
4.9 
iOO.O 
1983 
46.2 
24.4 
19.0 
8 ., 
• .J.. 
5.5 
3.5 
25. 1 
7.4 
95.8 
4.2 
100.0 
1984 
43.6 
23.7 
15. 1 
3.6 
8.7 
5.8 
3. 1 
26.3 
8.6 
96. 1 
3.9 
10(1.0 
1985 
47. 1 
24.9 
14.2 
3.5 
8.4 
5.5 
3.4 
24.3 
7.8 
96.5 
3.5 
100.0 
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Table A.2 
Niger: Indices of Physical Production of Selected Crops, 1978- 1984 
(1978 = 100) 
1978 1979 1980 
Millet 100.0 111.8 121.5 
Sorghum 100.0 94.6 99.2 
Rice 100.0 75. 1 96.9 
Cow peas 100.0 111.8 97.8 
Groundnuts 100.0 89.0 126.0 
Cotton 100.0 69.0 64.5 
Year 
1981 
117.0 
86.8 
125.0 
98.2 
102.0 
40. 1 
1982 
115.2 
96.2 
128.2 
100.0 
88.0 
44.5 
1983 1984 
118.0 69.3 
97.5 64.7 
134.4 159.5 
98.9 71.7 
74.0 31.0 
89.0 144.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Calculations based on data reported in Toh (1986). 
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Table A.3 
Niger: Distribution of Cooperatives and GMs by Department, 1984• 
Department 
Niamey 
Dosso 
Tahoua 
Maradi 
Zi nder 
Di ffa 
Agadez 
Total 
Number of 
Cooperatives 
292 
104 
202 
188 
243 
81 
57 
1167 
Number o+ 
GMs 
1632 
1415 
1671 
2273 
2684 
718 
'l"t'C: 
.I..•J'IJ 
10628 
Number of 
Villages 
1334 
1292 
1157 
2047 
2142 
547 
110 
8829 
Source: Union Nationale de Cooperatives <UNC). 
• GM: ueroupement Mutualiste", the basic (vlllage-levell unit of 
cooperatives. 
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Table A.4 
CNCA : Liabilities and Capital. Composition at End of Year, 
1978/79 - 1984/84 
Central Bank 
Check1ng Accounts 
Current Accounts 
Banks & Correspondents 
Deferred Payments 
Fixed-term Deposits 
Lines of Credit 
Adjustment Accounts 
Reserves & Guarantee 
Funds 
Undistributed Profits 
Capital 
Current Profit 
1978-
-1979 
52.1 
1.1 
1.3 
1.9 
0.8 
17.0 
6.2 
0.9 
5.7 
12.6 
0.6 
Source: Masini and Graham (1986). 
1979-
-1980 
7. 
34.6 
2.2 
1.4 
4.0 
0.7 
24.6 
14.6 
3.4 
4.8 
7.9 
1.9 
Year 
1980- 1981-
-1981 -1982 
7. i. 
30.5 30.7 
2. 1 6.7 
5.6 2.7 
5.5 3.6 
2.5 2.5 
18.0 18.5 
18.0 14.1 
2.6 7.8 
7.3 5.6 
1.0 
6.7 5.9 
1.2 1.0 
1982-
-1983 
i. 
41.9 
4.2 
2. 1 
1.0 
2.4 
13.6 
13.6 
8.6 
5.0 
1.6 
4.8 
1.1 
1983-
-1984 
i. 
35.2 
4.0 
3.0 
2.8 
13.9 
17.4 
7.9 
6.2 
3.1 
5.4 
1.2 
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Table A.5 
CNCA : Financial Assets. Annual Rates of Change and 
Coaposition at Year End, 1978/79 - 1984/85 
---------~------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Year 
1978- 1979- 1980- 1981- 1982- 1983- 1984-
-1979 -1980 -1981 -1982 -1983 -1984 -1985 
X X X X X X 'I ,. 
-------------------------------------
Rates of Change 
Cash, CCP, Central Bank -57.5 541.0 -78.0 112.7 -21.9 
Banks ~ Correspondents 119.6 37.8 -%.0 254.3 349.5 
Overdrafts 37.8 5.5 21.0 36.4 -16.1 -5.6 
Short-tera Loans -30.6 155.9 -10.6 14.4 -13.8 -BO.B 
Medius-term loans 111.9 18.1 -0.9 3.5 -4.1) -23.8 
Doubtful Loans less Provisions 29.2 66.2 -63.9 -100.0 
Total 52.9 13.3 10.8 24.0 -12.9 
Percentage Coaposition 
Cash, CCP, Central Bank 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Banks & Correspondents O.b 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 
Overdrafts 69.7 62.8 58.5 63.9 70.3 67.7 
Short-tera Loans 3.5 1. 6 3.6 2.9 2.6 2.6 
Hediu1-ter1 Loans 24.3 33.7 35.1 31.4 26.2 28.9 
Doubtful Loans less Provisions 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.6 (1.5 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Masini and Srahat (19Sb), 
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Table A.6 
CNCA : Average Return on loans, 1979/80 - 1983/84 
Medium-term 
Interest & Commissions 
(million CFA f) 
Average Capital 
(million CFA f) 
Average Return, 7. 
Short-term 
Interest & Commissions 
(million CFA f) 
Average Capital 
(million CfA f) 
Average Return, 7. 
Overdrafts 
Interest lc Commissions 
(million CfA f) 
Average Capital 
( mi 11 ion CfA f) 
Average Return, 7. 
1979-
-1980 
174.8 
2689.6 
6.5 
26.1 
208.3 
12.5 
824.5 
5885.8 
14.0 
1980-
-1981 
243.5 
3984.8 
6.1 
68.6 
303.6 
22.6 
949.5 
7009.5 
13.6 
Year 
1981-
-1982 
270.8 
4295.3 
6.3 
29.1 
413.5 
7.0 
1359.2 
7952.4 
17.1 
1982-
-1983 
358.4 
4349.6 
8.2 
21.3 
418.4 
5.1 
1846.9 
10289.5 
18.0 
1983-
-1984 
189.9 
4334.4 
4.4 
10.1 
415.8 
2.4 
1644.9 
10917.4 
15. 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Masini and Graham ( 1986). 
